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ABSTRACT. The United States often ratifies multilateral treaties by relying on what are com-
monly referred to as reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs). RUDs limit the
domestic effect of treaties and confine provisions to particular meanings consistent with the
United States' practices. In recent years, during and after the U.S. Supreme Court's consideration
of Bond v. United States, some government officials have become increasingly concerned that
RUDs could be unenforceable in courts, thereby exposing the United States to unintended treaty
commitments and liabilities. Remarkably, the legal literature does not contain a comprehensive
account of the extent to which RUDs are enforceable in courts of law. Such an understanding
may influence domestic and international perspectives on ratifying future treaties, including the
pending Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea. Consequently, this Note provides an original, searching review of the
jurisprudence of RUDs in U.S. and international courts. It finds that U.S. courts and interna-
tional courts consistently enforce RUDs, except for international courts reviewing treaties that
expressly prohibit their use. Such findings should offer solace to those worried about the possi-
bility that RUDs are inadequate to protect against unintended domestic effects of treaties. At the
same time, they also reveal that the real concern over RUDs is not their insufficient drafting, but
rather their overuse. There is a risk that treaties may increasingly prohibit RUDs, and that inter-
national courts will readily enforce these prohibitions. Given that there is no threat of the domes-
tic invalidity of RUDs, this Note argues that the United States and other states should refrain
from overusing RUDs and consequently risking broader treaty formulation and compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, as the U.S. Senate debated advice and consent to ratify the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the U.S. Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in Bond v. United States,' a peculiar case involving a do-
mestic application of the International Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction. The Third Circuit had held that the prohibitions of the
Convention, and of the accompanying Chemical Weapons Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1998, applied to a domestic defendant who had tried to get
revenge for an extramarital affair by spreading small amounts of toxic chemi-
cals on the plaintiff's property. Ultimately reversed by the Court later that year,
the case nonetheless alarmed many who expected that the Chemical Weapons
Convention could not possibly regulate local criminal activity. That the Disabil-
ities Convention could be similarly construed was not lost on senators during
hearings on that Convention.2
Bond reignited national interest in reservations, understandings, and decla-
rations, or RUDs, despite not addressing such provisions directly. RUDs are
often used by the U.S. Senate in an effort to prevent unintended consequences
stemming from treaty ratification. Loosely defined, RUDs are attachments on
international treaties made by a ratifying state that alter or clarify the legal
effect of treaty provisions.' In the United States, they are generally adopted by
1. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
2. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES, S. ExEc. REP. No. 113-12, at 40-42 (2014) [hereinafter HEARING ON THE CON-
VENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES] (statement of Sen. Bob Corker)
("Whenever a bill or a treaty is passed, there are some unintended consequences .... Just
today, there is a Supreme Court hearing that is taking place. Arguments are being argued
over a lady in Pennsylvania named Bond, who, unbelievably, was convicted of a law under
the Chemical Weapons Treaty that we put in place back in 1997. And so, sometimes when
people raise concerns, they are actually legitimate.").
3. Some scholars have recognized as many as twelve types of conditions (i.e., amendments,
conditions, declarations, exceptions, exclusions, explanations, interpretations, provisos, rec-
ommendations, reservations, statements, and understandings). See Kevin C. Kennedy, Con-
ditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 89, 99-122
(1996). With minor exceptions and variations, however, RUDs have become a standard cat-
egory for capturing the various conditions adopted at the time of treaty advice and consent
or ratification. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs, 3 U.
St. Thomas L.J. 311 (2005) (discussing RUDs as a category of conditions); Louis Henkin,
Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995) (same); cf Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 405 (2000) ("For
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the Senate when it is giving its advice and consent to a treaty, and they must be
included should the President decide to ratify the treaty. RUDs have allowed
the United States to ratify treaties without assuming international obligations
that might conflict with domestic obligations or otherwise place the govern-
ment in a difficult legal or political position.4 Non-self-executing RUDs,s in-
cluding the one involved in Bond, keep international treaties and their stand-
ards from having domestic effects, including from being enforceable in
domestic courts.6 For these reasons, the United States has both commonly and
increasingly employed RUDs, as have many other states.7
The concern that treaties could have unintended domestic effects disquiet-
ed senators and other government officials who wondered to what extent they
could rely on this practice for limiting the effects of treaties.8 For example, dur-
ing a congressional panel on the Disabilities Convention, one senator inquired
whether RUDs could be inadequate and unenforceable:
purposes of this Article, the three most important forms of conditional consent, whatever
their labels, have been the power not to consent to particular treaty terms, the power to con-
sent to a treaty on the condition that it has no domestic force in the absence of congressional
implementation, and the power to take account of the United States' [] federal structure in
negotiating and implementing a treaty.").
4. For instance, the United States ratified the Genocide Convention, the Convention Against
Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention To
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination using RUDs. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at
311, 320-27.
5. While non-self-executing reservations (also referred to as declarations) are sometimes dis-
cussed separately from the larger category of RUDs, they are similar to reservations and are
included as RUDs in this Note. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 346 ("The U.S. practice of de-
claring human rights conventions non-self-executing is commonly seen as of a piece with
the other RUDs.").
6. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 416 ("RUDs are designed to harmonize the tr aties
with existing requirements of U.S. law and to leave domestic implementation of the treaties
to Congress."); Henkin, supra note 3, at 346 ("As the reservations designed to deny interna-
tional obligations serve to immunize the United States from external judgment, the declara-
tion that a convention shall be non-self-executing is designed to keep its own judges from
judging the human rights conditions in the United States by international standards.").
7. See, e.g., John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of
State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 392 (1980) (estimating, since World War II, an average
of one reservation per state every five years on a multilateral treaty); Goldsmith, supra note
3, at 312-18 (observing that the U.S. practice of RUDs is common among liberal democra-
cies).
8. See, e.g., Hearing on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 2, at 41
("And I think it is our obligation to look at the effects that a treaty like this could have on
domestic law. I am not one of those folks who thinks there is somebody behind every
woodpile trying to do something. I just want to make sure that we, in fact, pass a treaty and
it has the relevant RUDs.").
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Is there a way, in your opinion, to write RUDs, on the front end of a
treaty, that would absolutely ensure that there is no way for this treaty
to affect either the federalism issues that we have to deal with or to
cause a court to look to the treaty to actually affect the individual lives
of citizens here in the country? Is there a way of us coming together and
writing RUDs in that way?'
While Bond fueled these worries, shared by many senators,o they are not
new. Rather, these concerns have persisted and resurfaced many times over the
last few decades as government officials questioned the judicial enforceability
of RUDs." Whether RUDs are enforceable raises deep questions regarding the
effectiveness and robustness of treatymaking and its future. Depending on
their enforceability, the use of RUDs implicates the entire constitutional system
of treatymaking and whether and how the United States ratifies treaties.12 And
in turn, if courts will enforce RUDs, should that change how they are drafted?
What are the legal effects of using certain RUDs over others?
These questions are of particular import domestically and internationally as
treatymaking risks being substituted by alternatives such as congressional-
9. Id. at 88.
10. See, e.g., id. at 42-43 (statement of Sen. Kelly Ayotte) ("When this treaty came before the
Senate last year, it fell just five votes short of passage. In debating the treaty's merits, treaty
opponents expressed concern that the [Disabilities Convention] would diminish American
sovereignty, that, through U.S. ratification, the United Nations would somehow be able to
supersede U.S. law, even by interfering with American parents' right to homeschool their
children. Along with Senator John McCain, Secretary John Kerry, and others, I could not
disagree more strongly with this view. This treaty contains reservations, understandings,
and declarations, otherwise known as RUDs, that explicitly describe how the treaty will, and
will not, apply to the United States.").
11. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVEN-
TION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. EXEc. REP. No. 92-6, at 16 (1971) ("A
related concern that the Supreme Court would disregard the proposed understandings, re-
verts to the allegation that the understandings contravene the explicit language of the con-
vention despite the committee's expressed view to the contrary. The Supreme Court can be
expected to give full weight to the view of the committee and the negotiating history of the
convention in any matter that might come before the Court in connection with the treaty.");
Charles H. Dearborn, III, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty Provisions Are
Not Self-Executing, 57 TEx. L. REV. 233, 244 (1979) ("The State Department and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee apparently disagree on the domestic effect of declarations and
understandings. The State Department agrees ... that any statement attached by the Senate
is a condition of ratification and is therefore binding on the courts. The Foreign Relations
Committee is less confident.").
12. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 348 ("There is more at issue in the United States RUDs than
their effect on a particular treaty; at stake in United States human rights reservation policy is
the integrity of the constitutional system for concluding treaties.").
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executive agreements." As of now, treaties remain the most frequent, if not ex-
clusive, instruments for agreements in a number of areas, including arms con-
trol, dispute settlement, and human rights.14 With them, RUDs remain central
tools in the ratification process. As of June 2016, there were thirty-eight treaties
pending before the Senate, including the Disabilities Convention and the Unit-
ed Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),s and questions
over the enforceability and effects of RUDs are paramount to whether these
treaties could ultimately be ratified by the United States. Alternately, the invali-
dation of RUDs could be devastating. Not only would the United States face
the type of domestic lawsuits presented in Bond, but it could also be forced into
a variety of international disputes and into rescissions of its conditional con-
sent. 16
But so far, despite their significance, legal scholars and U.S. government
officials assessing RUDs have mainly spoken past each other. Senators and
presidential administrations have mostly worried about actual enforceability,
while legal scholars have instead presumed that RUDs will be enforceable.
These scholars often argue over the optimal level of RUD usage, and they pri-
marily debate about whether the practice of RUDs is good law and good policy.
These perspectives are important in their own right, but they are informed by
and benefit from being joined together. Namely, before exploring the domestic
and international effects of RUDs, and how the Senate and other government
13. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law-
making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1239 (2008) (documenting the increasing use
of congressional-executive agreements); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and
Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REv. 961, 965 (2001) (same).
14. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 1261-62 (observing that human rights, arms control, dispute set-
tlement, aviation, the environment, labor, consular relations, taxation, and telecommunica-
tions are still areas generally reserved for Article II treaties); Spiro, supra note 13, at 996 (ob-
serving that arms control agreements, mutual security pacts, and human rights conventions
are exclusively conducted through treaties, in contrast to multilateral trade and other inter-
national economic undertakings, which have been conducted through congressional-
executive agreements); see also Spiro, supra note 13, at looo ("Human rights conventions
have been submitted to the legislative branch only in the form of treaties. It does not even
appear to have been suggested that they be submitted as congressional-executive agree-
ments.").
is. Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S.
DEP'T ST. (June 20, 2016), http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending [http://perma.cc
/QGN8-C8QX].
16. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277 (1995) (discussing
how the United States could be violating international obligations or might no longer be a
party if reservations are found invalid).
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institutions could determine their optimal use, the scope of RUDs' enforceabil-
ity needs to be understood. Once that picture is clear, arguments over the prop-
er scope of RUDs can be brought into focus.
This Note embarks on that task. It explores two major questions. First, are
RUDs enforceable in courts of law? Second, if RUDs are enforceable, what is
their optimal use in the treaty ratification process? To answer these questions,
this Note bases both its positive and normative components on a searching
analysis of case law discussing the judicial enforceability of RUDs in both U.S.
and international courts." The analysis includes forty-seven U.S. cases discuss-
ing RUDs as a general category and twenty-six U.S. cases discussing interpre-
tative understandings and declarations, out of approximately 650 reviewed cas-
es. The analysis also includes fourteen cases from international courts, out of
approximately 300 reviewed cases, including cases from the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the UNCLOS tribunal and arbitral bodies, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.
Ultimately, this Note finds that U.S. courts and international courts con-
sistently enforce RUDs, except for international courts reviewing treaties that
expressly prohibit their use. These findings should offer solace to those worried
about the inadequacies of RUDs, and they provide a compelling reason for re-
visiting the concerns over their use. This Note argues that based on this case
law, the real concerns for the United States and other states should be the legal
effects of RUDs on an international order that seeks to encourage genuine and
full treaty participation, rather than their ability to mitigate unintended domes-
tic effects. Without a viable threat to the domestic validity of RUDs, this Note
reasons that the United States and other states should refrain from overusing
RUDs and consequently jeopardizing broader treaty formulation and compli-
ance.
The Note is organized in four major parts. Part I begins by providing back-
ground about the use of RUDs and traditional rationales both for and against
their use. While some proponents have argued that RUDs allow for more
states, including the United States, to participate in the ratification of multilat-
eral treaties, others are more critical and argue that RUDs contribute to super-
ficial ratifications. While legal scholars have documented the history, motiva-
tions, scope, and effects of RUDs, particularly as they relate to the Vienna Con-
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the judicial enforceability of RUDs
17. Appendix A reviews the case review methodology in detail. While the search is not exhaus-
tive of all cases that discuss RUDs, it is intended to be representative of the major, governing
case law on RUDs.
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has not yet been comprehensively examined. The issue of enforceability is
nonetheless an important piece of this normative debate because it provides a
more realistic picture of what legal effects RUDs could have, if any at all.
Parts II and III take up this question about enforceability. Part II describes
how, in U.S. courts, RUDs are nearly always recognized as valid. U.S. courts
have only questioned the validity of RUDs when they were not properly com-
municated to other state parties, when their text did not support an argued in-
terpretation, or when they focused on issues of wholly domestic concern. A few
judges have published dissents arguing against the validity of RUDs, but these
opinions were not controlling. Part III, in turn, describes how, with few excep-
tions, international courts also usually defer to RUDs. The ICJ has indicated
that it can invalidate a reservation as incompatible with the object and purpose
of a treaty pursuant to Article 19 of the VCLT. Yet the ICJ has only invalidated a
RUD where the treaty in question expressly prohibited such a RUD. Rules
stipulated by a treaty may also shape how other courts review RUDs. The EC-
tHR, for instance, applies treaty rules to invalidate RUDs that are of a general
character or fail to include a statement of the law concerned.
Finally, Part IV draws lessons from this account of the judicial enforceabil-
ity of RUDs and argues for certain treaty practices based on those lessons.
First, the case analysis indicates that U.S. officials can take solace in the fact
that RUDs will continue to have the force of law in domestic and international
courts; every indication therefore seems to suggest that RUDs are here to stay.
But some of the traditional concerns over RUDs could and should be revisited,
including what RUDs signal about treaty formulation and compliance, and the
risk that RUDs increasingly could be prohibited in treaties altogether. For that
reason, this Note concludes that the real risk with respect to RUDs is not their
insufficient drafting, but rather their overuse. Given little threat of the domestic
invalidity of RUDs, the United States should not overuse RUDs and risk com-
promising broader treaty formulation and compliance among states.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AND CONCERNS OVER RUDS
The origins of RUDs and their important role in supporting the United
States' treaty ratification efforts date back to the early 1950s when U.S. Senator
John Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment to make all treaties non-
self-executing." When that amendment failed by one vote,9 senators turned
18. For a history of the Bricker Amendment and the concerns of senators who wanted to limit
international interference with domestic laws and rights, see Judith Resnik, Law's Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J.
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to RUDs as an alternative means by which to ratify treaties while preserving
sovereignty, federalism, and other apparent American concerns.20 The United
States' participation in human rights treaties, which only took off in the 1970s,
has relied on the use of RUDs for these purposes ever since.2 1
But while U.S. senators have mainly sought to draft RUDs so that they will
be unassailable in courts, legal scholars have mostly focused on theoretical dis-
cussions of their effects, particularly with respect to how RUDs will influence
international treaty formulation and compliance.22 Some have supported the
value of RUDs in allowing states, including the United States, to participate
more actively in treatymaking.23 Along these lines, scholars have defended the
practice of RUDs as a valid exercise of the Senate's powers,24 and, more broad-
1564, 1606-12 (20o6); and Nelson Richards, The Bricker Amendment and Congress's Failure To
Check the Inflation of the Executive's Foreign Affairs Powers, 1951-1954, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 175,
184-206 (20o6). See also infra Section IV.A.1 (discussing the Bricker Amendment and subse-
quent changes in RUD practice).
ig. Richards, supra note 18, at 205.
20. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 3, at 341 ("United States adherence to human rights conven-
tions, after decades of resistance, should please all who support the international human
rights movement. In fact, many are not pleased. For the United States has attached to each
of its ratifications a 'package' of reservations, understandings and declarations
(RUDs) . . . .").
21. See, e.g., HEARING ON THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, su-
pra note 2, at 15o (statement of John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State) ("I would just start off by say-
ing we are ioo percent prepared, as we have been, to work through what are known as
RUDs, or the reservations, understandings, and declarations, in order to pass this treaty.
That is our goal."); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 400-01 ("Beginning in the 1970s,
the treatymakers crafted a way to commit the United States to human rights treaties in the
international arena while accommodating domestic concerns. They achieved these dual aims
by ratifying the treaties with a set of conditions. These conditions take the form of reserva-
tions, understandings, and declarations - collectively, 'RUDs' - to U.S. ratification.").
22. See, e.g., Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human
Rights Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397, 398 (2007) ("Scholars of international law and inter-
national relations are deeply divided in their views of the role RUDs play, their legitimacy,
and their consequences for the international human rights regime. . . ."); see also Edward T.
Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 307 (20o6) ("Reservations are, perennially and by
acclamation, one of the most complex and controversial parts of treaty law.").
23. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 457 ("[I]t is virtually impossible to reach
agreement on a treaty text that is acceptable to all nations. This is why, as was recognized in
the early days of the human rights movement, conditional consent is so important.");
Swaine, supra note 22, at 311 ("Treaty reservations not only increase the breadth of treaty
participation, as they were certainly intended to do, but also permit agreement on deeper
commitments than would otherwise be possible.").
24. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 405 ("Since the 1790s, this greater power to
withhold consent altogether has been viewed as including the lesser power to consent to
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ly, as a legitimate function of states that are serious about adopting treaty obli-
gations.25 Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that RUDs may lead to
more honest reflections of the positions of reserving states26 and can provide a
starting point for engaging with and eventually internalizing particular
norms.2 7
Critics meanwhile have condemned the practice of RUDs on both legal and
functional grounds,28 accusing RUDs of leading to a "specious, meretricious,
[and] hypocritical" process of ratification,29 through which the United States
reaps the benefits of treaty participation while never assuming any obliga-
tions.o More specifically, some have criticized RUDs as detracting from the
United States' moral commitments to human rights, including, for example,
those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)." Similarly, within the broader international community, RUDs have
some provisions of the treaty but not others."); see also Goldsmith, supra note 3 (describing
and countering both domestic and international legal arguments against the validity of
RUDs).
25. See, e.g., Neumayer, supra note 22, at 398 ("From one perspective ... [r]eservations, under-
standings, and declarations are set up by those countries that take human rights seriously,
foremost the liberal democracies, while other countries need not bother because they have
no intention of complying anyway.").
26. See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 22, at 311 ("Reservations further help establish an information-
forcing mechanism that communicates significant information about the risks and benefits
of contracting with reserving states.").
27. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Comparative (In)equalities: CEDAW theJurisdiction of Gender, and the
Heterogeneity of Transnational Law Production, 10 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 531, 533 (2012) ("RUDs
offers paths to connections that, as one can see from their later withdrawals by some coun-
tries, enable a dynamic interaction as domestic legal regimes change over time'"); id. at 546
("RUDs are not necessarily static; they can provide a means of beginning conversations
about equality obligations.").
28. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 3, at 341 (observing that the United States' RUDs have "evoked
criticism abroad and dismayed supporters of ratification in the United States").
29. Id.
30. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and
"Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-ICENT L. REv. 515, 518 (1991) ("[T]he trend toward
non-self-executing treaty declarations is unfortunate and should be resisted. Domestic judi-
cial application of international treaties should be encouraged in the interests of effective en-
forcement of international law as well as the development of a body of jurisprudence under
the treaties."); Henkin, supra note 3, at 344 ("By adhering to human rights conventions sub-
ject to . . . reservations, the United States, it is charged, is pretending to assume internation-
al obligations but in fact is undertaking nothing. It is seen as seeking the benefits of partici-
pation in the convention ... without assuming any obligations or burdens." (footnote
omitted)).
31. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1179 (1993) (ar-
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been criticized as abrogating the universal values and commitments signaled by
human rights treaties32 and destroying any semblance of treaties as contracts."
Furthermore, RUDs risk contravening the VCLT by violating Article 19's pro-
hibition against reservations that are "incompatible with the object and pur-
pose of the treaty"34 and Article 27's restriction on citing domestic law to avoid
treaty obligations.
Both proponents and critics of RUDs acknowledge that there is an una-
voidable tradeoff between protecting the rights and consent of non-reserving
states that anticipate compliance with treaties in their entirety and the rights
and consent of reserving states that expect to have their RUDs honored, with
the VCLT 36 tilted toward protecting the rights of the latter.3 7 Yet before con-
cluding where the law should stand on allowing or limiting RUDs, more needs
to be known about what he law already provides about their enforceability.
This is after all the major concern of senators deciding whether to ratify treaties
with RUDs. In other words, whether RUDs are already limited in courts of law
is a practical reality that has demanded the attention of government officials
and should inform any normative consideration of their use.
guing that the United States' RUDs to the ICCPR violate its good faith obligations to the
treaty commitments); Kristina Ash, Note, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, Nw. J. INT'L HUM.
RTs., Spring 2005, ¶ 46 (discussing specific RUDs that the United States should withdraw
from the ICCPR).
32. See, e.g., Neumayer, supra note 22, at 398 ("From the competing second account, however,
RUDs are regarded with great concern, if not hostility. This is because of the supposed char-
acter of human rights as universally applicable, which is seen as being undermined if coun-
tries can opt out of their obligations.").
33. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 118o ("No treaty, contract, or legal obligation can be
binding on all parties if one party can opt out of any provision at will and also change posi-
tions in time, alternatively considering itself bound and then not bound by a given provi-
sion.").
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after VCLT].
3s. Id. art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
36. The VCLT establishes guidelines on when RUDs should be used and will be discussed in
more detail in Part III.
37. See Swaine, supra note 22, at 310 ("[T] here is wide agreement about the character of existing
law: namely, that there is a sharp tradeoff between honoring the consent of non-reserving
states (who, with respect to another state's reservation, would for those limited purposes
take the treaty as originally negotiated) and respecting the conditioned consent of reserving
states, and that the Vienna Convention decisively favors the latter, upsetting an intended
balance between them." (footnotes omitted)).
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Remarkably, the legal literature does not contain a comprehensive answer
to the persistent questions over the judicial enforceability of RUDs. In the lim-
ited instances where the issue has been considered, RUDs have generally been
summarily presumed to be valid in courts of law." The positive account of
RUDs has focused on exploring their possible rules and limitations based on
the VCLT's provisions on reservations or on the effect of one state's objections
on another state's RUD."9 Several early works were devoted to studying the
history, motivations, scope, and effects of RUDs across states and treaties, par-
ticularly by comparing and connecting them to the principles set forth in the
VCLT.4 0 Others have explored how parties should be bound if RUDs are inval-
38. The closest and most helpful account engaging with this question is an article from the turn
of the century, Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, which focused on defending RUDs rather
than reviewing their treatment by courts. Citing a few early U.S. court cases, the authors
presumed that no court has ever invalidated Senate conditions. Id. at 410. The authors did
not, however, focus on an in-depth analysis of domestic or international jurisprudence on
RUDs; they assumed that RUDs would be justified in a similar way to the dualistic ap-
proach taken for other legal questions. Id. at 440 ("U.S. courts follow a dualist approach to
the relationship between international law and domestic law: They treat international and
domestic law as distinct, they rely on domestic law to determine international law's status
within the U.S. legal system, and, in case of a conflict, they generally give domestic law pri-
macy over international law. Consistent with this dualistic approach, U.S. courts are likely to
judge the legal validity of the RUDs ultimately by reference to domestic constitutional
law.").
39. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 531 (2002) (exploring potential legal remedies in cases where RUDs are
found to be invalid under the VCLT); Jan Klabbers, Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Nor-
dic Approach to Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 69 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 179, 192 (2000)
(discussing the VCLT's and Nordic practice of objecting to the reservations of other states);
Roslyn Moloney, Incompatible Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Prob-
lem of State Consent, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 155, 158-62 (2004) (exploring the potential conse-
quences and use of severability if RUDs are found to be invalid under the VCLT); Swaine,
supra note 22, at 307-08 (discussing how to interpret the VCLT's effects on RUDs, including
especially how they relate to non-reserving states' interests); Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Note,
The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEx. INT'L L.J.
69, 71 (1994) (discussing the United States' capital punishment reservation and the VCLT's
"object and purpose" requirement).
40. See, e.g., FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILAT-
ERAL TREATIES (1988); LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREA-
TIES: RATIFY AND RUIN? (1994); Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos Case: New Light on Res-
ervations to Multilateral Treaties, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 347 (1989); Massimo Coccia, Reservations to
Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985); Richard W. Edwards,
Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 362 (1989); Jean Kyongun Koh, Comment,
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23
HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1982).
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idated.4 1 But scholars studying these VCLT provisions and the broader law sur-
rounding RUDs, which many consider to be unclear,42 do not provide con-
sistent guidance as to how courts will treat RUDs. Additionally, the United
States has not ratified the VCLT, and except among scholars who consider the
VCLT customary international law, it is not clear if the VCLT binds the United
States.43
As the Introduction suggests, an account of the depth and breadth of this
enforceability is all the more pressing as it may influence the likelihood that the
United States will ratify further treaties. More broadly, such an account may
address the longstanding concerns of senators and other government officials
and allow them to engage more fully with the question of the optimal scope of
RUDs that has long been the focus of legal scholars. This Note endeavors to fill
this gap by providing an original and searching account of how courts enforce,
and do not enforce, RUDs.
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF RUDS IN U.S. COURTS
Article II of the Constitution governs the treatymaking process in the Unit-
ed States.44 This process generally begins with the President's administration
negotiating the terms of a treaty with foreign states, followed by a signature
and transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent.45 The Senate can
provide its advice and consent by approving the treaty through a two-thirds
vote and a resolution sending the treaty back to the President, or it can keep the
treaty pending. As part of its advice and consent, the Senate can condition its
41. See, e.g., Roberto Baratta, Should Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Be Disregard-
ed?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 413, 421-25 (2000) (proposing possibilities for how states should or
should not still be bound if a RUD is invalidated); Goodman, supra note 39 (same).
42. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 424 ("Unfortunately, the provisions of the
Vienna Convention relating to reservations are vaguely worded and have provoked disa-
greement among commentators and inconsistent national interpretations.").
43. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 307, 307-08 (2007) (discussing how the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention but that some scholars consider it to be bound by some provisions they consider
to be customary international law).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("The President ... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur
45. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1o6TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 117-45 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter
CRS REPORT ON TREATIES] (outlining the U.S. trearymaking process, including RUDs as
conditions proposed by the Senate and binding on the President).
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approval by adopting RUDs in its approving resolution. The President can
then either choose to ratify the treaty with the RUDs becoming a part of the
United States' agreement4 or refuse to ratify the treaty altogether.47 It is largely
understood among states that in bilateral treaties, consent to the RUDs by the
other state party is required before the RUDs can go into effect; in multilateral
treaties, consent by each state party is generally not required unless the treaty
appears to require it. 4 8
While RUDs can take many forms, they can generally be characterized in
one of three ways.49 Reservations qualify U.S. obligations without necessarily
changing the treaty's text.so They are often used to except the United States
from certain problematic treaty provisions, to avoid conflicts between treaty
provisions and the U.S. Constitution, or to escape obligations where there are
political or policy disagreements." Meanwhile, understandings clarify or elab-
orate provisions but do not change them.52 They are used to explain the United
States' interpretation of certain treaty terms and to clarify its consent to a par-
ticular provision." Finally, declarations express the Senate's position on mat-
ters relating to issues raised by the treaty as a whole.54 A common declaration is
46. While the President may propose conditions, the Senate usually does so. Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 3, at 404 ("Usually the Senate has proposed ... conditions, but sometimes
the President has as well.").
47. CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 15o ("The option of resubmitting the entire
treaty permits the flexibility of delaying ratification of a treaty if, for example, the President
expects an imminent change in the fundamental circumstances which gave rise to the
agreement. It also permits him, in instances in which the Senate has rejected a treaty or at-
tached reservations he opposed to a treaty, to wait for more favorable circumstances and re-
submit the treaty. The President may also resubmit a treaty in a renegotiated form should a
Senate understanding, declaration, or reservation alter or restrict its meaning to such a de-
gree that it was unacceptable to him or to the other party to the agreement.").
48. See, e.g., VCLT, supra note 34, art. 20, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337 ("A reservation expressly author-
ized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States
unless the treaty so provides . . . . When it appears from the limited number of the negotiat-
ing States and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its en-
tirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound
by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.").
49. See Gamble, Jr., supra note 7, at 373 ("This matter of a definition, while relatively simple in
the abstract, can be difficult in practice. However, there is considerable consistency among
authoritative sources that have grappled with the problem.").
50. CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 11.
51. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 417-18 (describing substantive reservations).
52. CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 11.
53. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 418-19 (describing interpretative conditions).
54. CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 11.
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one that declares the treaty to be non-self-executing or nonenforceable in U.S.
courts as long as there is no implementing domestic legislation."
For example, the Senate provided its advice and consent for the ICCPR
while adopting several RUDs, including the following:
* a reservation that "the United States reserves the right, subject
to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment
on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws, permitting the imposition of capi-
tal punishment, including such punishment for crimes commit-
ted by persons below eighteen years of age";5 6
* an understanding that the "Covenant shall be implemented by
the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative
and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that
state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such mat-
ters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to
the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of
the state or local governments may take appropriate measures
for the fulfillment of the Covenant";17 and
* a declaration that "the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing.""
According to a quantitative analysis of RUDs documenting 200 years of the
United States' treatymaking up until 1996, the United States entered into 1,286
treaties pursuant to Article II, including 195 (or fifteen percent) with RUDs
55. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 419-22 (describing non-self-executing declara-
tions). There is also a considerable amount of literature and case law on treaties that are on
their own terms non-self-executing, but that legal inquiry has so far been separate and not
involved with the enforceability of RUDs. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)
(considering treaties that are by their own terms non-self-executing); Curtis A. Bradley, In-
tent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540 (2008) (same).
56. 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992). The ICCPR restricts capital punishment for crimes committed
by persons under eighteen years of age. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 6(5), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 ("Sentence of
death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.").
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adopted during the Senate's advice and consent process.9 A more recent analy-
sis reviewing 400 multilateral treaties ratified between 1960 and 2009 suggests
that the United States' use of RUDs has increased and continues to increase
over time.6 0 But even while RUDs have become a standard feature of modern
treatymaking practice, their actual enforceability in courts has largely been pre-
sumed. Scholars have not looked in depth into the range of court cases review-
ing the use of RUDs.
In this Part, I analyze U.S. case law to determine the enforceability of RUDs
in U.S. courts. To construct a comprehensive set of U.S. court cases directly en-
gaging with the enforceability of RUDs, I conducted a search for all federal
cases containing the term "RUDs" (a common term in public international law
and among courts), which returned twenty-seven cases. I then conducted a
second search using the search string "reservations, understandings, and decla-
rations," which returned 393 cases, which, upon review, included twenty
unique cases that engaged with the question of the legal validity of RUDs. To
capture cases that may not refer to this grouping, I conducted a third search us-
ing a more general search string in order to locate interpretative understand-
ings and declarations and reviewed the most relevant 250 cases returned.61
The remainder of this Part describes the prevailing view in U.S. case law
that RUDs are valid and enforceable in U.S. courts. It then discusses the few
instances in which the validity of RUDs has been questioned.
A. Valid and Enforceable RUDs in U.S. Courts
In the cases reviewed, U.S. courts consistently recognize the validity and
enforceability of RUDs and consider them to be legally binding as a condition
of the Senate's advice and consent.6 2 If the Senate conditions its approval of a
59. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 91.
60. Cindy Galway Buys, Conditions in U.S. Treaty Practice: New Data and Insights on a Growing
Phenomenon, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 363, 377 (2016) ("[I]n the 196os and 1970s, the
United States only added conditions to its multilateral treaties 11-12% of the time. That per-
centage rose to 21-26% during the 198os and 199os. More recently, the United States has
added conditions to its treaties at an even higher rate. By the 2000S, the United States added
conditions to the multilateral treaties it ratified 34% of the time.").
61. Appendix A describes the methodology for this search, and Appendix B contains a complete
list of the cases reviewed and deemed to be relevant to RUD practice.
62. RUDs are usually the product of the Senate's treaty approval process but can also be intro-
duced by the President. See, e.g., CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 124 ("The For-
eign Relations Committee may recommend that the Senate approve treaties conditionally,
granting its advice and consent only subject to certain stipulations that the President must
accept before proceeding to ratification. The President, of course, also may propose, at the
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treaty upon certain RUDs, the President can ratify the treaty only with those
RUDs. This has been the longtime understanding of the constitutional ar-
rangement.6 3
1. U.S. Supreme Court Case Law
The U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on the validity of
RUDs, but it has implicitly recognized their validity by enforcing them in a
number of cases. Most prominently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican na-
tional sued the Drug Enforcement Administration for an arbitrary arrest.64
Among several claims, the plaintiff argued that the arrest violated his rights
under Article 9 of the ICCPR.65 The Court recognized the ICCPR's non-self-
executing declaration as dispositive for rejecting that claim, explaining that the
Senate granted its advice and consent to the ICCPR with a reservation provid-
ing that the treaty "was not self-executing and so did not itself create obliga-
tions enforceable in the federal courts."66
time of a treaty's transmission to the Senate or during the Senate's consideration of it, that
the Senate attach certain conditions or stipulations in the course of giving its advice and
consent."); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 404 ("Usually the Senate has proposed
these conditions, but sometimes the President has as well.").
63. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 94-95; see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 374-75 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Of course the Senate has unquestioned power to enforce its own
understanding of treaties. It may, in the form of a resolution, give its consent on the basis of
conditions. If these are agreed to by the President and accepted by the other contracting par-
ties, they become part of the treaty and of the law of the United States . . . . If they are not
agreed to by the President, his only constitutionally permissible course is to decline to ratify
the treaty, and his ratification without the conditions would presumably provide the basis
for impeachment."). The mandatory and binding nature of RUDs is also consistent with
and endorsed by the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314 (AM.
LAW. INST. 1987) ("(1) When the Senate of the United States gives its advice and consent to
a treaty on condition that the United States enter a reservation, the President, if he makes
the treaty, must include the reservation in the instrument of ratification or accession, or oth-
erwise manifest that the adherence of the United States is subject to the reservation. (2)
When the Senate gives its advice and consent to a treaty on the basis of a particular under-
standing of its meaning, the President, if he makes the treaty, must do so on the basis of the
Senate's understanding.").
64- 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 56, art. 9, cl. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175 ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.").
66. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.
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Expressly recognizing the existence of RUDs, the Court observed that
"[s] everal times ... the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts
the task of interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when
its ratification of the [ICCPR] declared that the substantive provisions of the
document were not self-executing."67 Furthermore, the Court held that alt-
hough the United States was bound by the ICCPR, "the United States ratified
the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and
so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts."68 The
Court denied the argument that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the ICCPR could themselves constitute the relevant and applicable rules of
international law.69 While not commenting on the validity and enforceability of
RUDs in general, the Court recognized a specific non-self-executing declara-
tion, a reservation with arguably some of the most significant legal effects
among RUDs,70 as valid and enforceable.
The Court has also weighed in at least twice on interpretative understand-
ings and declarations, although apparently only in cases concerning bilateral
treaties. In 1853, the Court held in Doe v. Braden that written declarations inter-
preting ambiguous language that are then ratified by the other party become a
part of the treaty and are therefore obligatory." Almost a century later, the
Court recognized a declaration "providing that nothing in the treaty should be
67. Id. at 728.
68. Id. at 735 (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Note that judges and scholars often refer to non-self-executing provisions as both reserva-
tions and declarations. The distinguishing factor is mainly one of definition: "Whether the
non-self-execution declaration is a reservation or not depends on the definition of non-self-
execution being used. When the President (or Senate) defined the non-self-execution decla-
ration in the sense that the U.S.' obligations under [the] ICCPR would provide no further
substantive rights protection, this definition clearly would make the declaration a reserva-
tion. On the other hand, when the declaration is defined in the sense that the U.S.' obliga-
tions under the ICCPR would not create new private causes of action, the declaration is not
a reservation." FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAw: TREATIES, CASES, AND ANALYSIS 226 n.30 (20o6).
71. 57 U.S. 635, 656 (1853) ("For it is too plain for argument that where one of the parties to a
treaty, at the time of its ratification annexes a written declaration explaining ambiguous lan-
guage in the instrument or adding a new and distinct stipulation, and the treaty is after-
wards ratified by the other party with the declaration attached to it, and the ratifications du-
ly exchanged-the declaration thus annexed is part of the treaty and as binding and
obligatory as if it were inserted in the body of the instrument. The intention of the parties is
to be gathered from the whole instrument, as it stood when the ratifications were ex-
changed.").
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construed to" have any meaning beyond what the qualification specified.72 Alt-
hough the Court referred to the declaration as an amendment, the language
suggests that the qualifier was in fact a RUD.` These two cases provide the
most persuasive authority that interpretative understandings and eclarations
constitute a part of the treaty and should therefore be enforced as part of the
treaty obligation, at least insofar as the RUD has received bilateral assent.
2. District and Circuit Court Case Law
Following the Supreme Court's guidance in Sosa, lower courts have consist-
ently upheld RUDs, often in even more direct terms. For example, lower courts
have repeatedly upheld reservations and declarations stating that certain trea-
ties or treaty provisions are non-self-executing, most prominently in cases in-
volving the ICCPR.74 In Igartia v. United States, for instance, the First Circuit
expressly recited the holding in Sosa that recognized the ICCPR as non-self-
executing given the Senate's condition at the time of advice and consent.7 ' The
Second Circuit was even more explicit, denying a claim under the ICCPR by
reasoning that "[tihe only ratified treaty cited... by [the plaintiff], the IC-
CPR, came with attached RUDs declaring that the ICCPR is not self-
executing. This declaration means that the provisions of the ICCPR do not cre-
ate a private right of action nor separate form of relief enforceable in United
States courts."76 In addition to enforcing the non-self-executing declaration,
lower courts have consistently upheld the reservation to the ICCPR that retains
72. Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 368 (1945).
73. Id. at 368-69 ("To four [treaties], including the Box Elder Treaty, the Senate added an
amendment providing that nothing in the treaty should be construed to admit 'any other or
greater title or interest in the lands embraced within the territories described in said treaty in
said tribes or bands of Indians than existed in them upon the acquisition of said territories
from Mexico by the laws thereof.'. . .Whatever may have been the complexities of the Mex-
ican cession title situation as described in the opinion of this Court, the Senate by this
amendment clearly indicated that it understood each treaty to constitute a recognition of In-
dian title to the land claimed, at least as to lands outside the Mexican cession. Had
the Senate been under the impression that no title rights were involved in the treaties it
would have been meaningless to add this amendment.").
74. See, e.g., Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding non-self-executing
status of ICCPR); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005) (accepting IC-
CPR as non-self-executing by way of RUDs).
75. Igartia, 626 F.3d at 604-05.
76. Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 137.
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the right of the United States to impose capital punishment on juveniles under
eighteen years of age, even though the ICCPR prohibits this practice."
With regard to interpretative understandings and declarations, most case
law comes from interpretations of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which
has been implicated indirectly through litigation under the Foreign Affairs Re-
form and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA)." In Auguste v. Ridge, the Third
Circuit applied the United States' "understanding" that torture must include a
specific intent element.9 The Second Circuit cited Auguste in reaching the same
conclusion two years later.0 The Ninth Circuit has similarly upheld interpreta-
tions of Article 3's "substantial grounds for believing that he would be in dan-
ger," which is the risk threshold above which a state cannot force refugees or
77. See, e.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (loth Cir. 2002) (upholding Senate reservations of
right to impose capital punishment on juvenile offenders); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248
(5th Cir. 2001) (same). The U.S. Supreme Court later held in Roper v. Simmons that it is un-
constitutional, under the Eighth Amendment, to impose capital punishment for crimes
committed by individuals under the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). The majority
did not find the reservation persuasive as evidence against a national consensus on juvenile
executions. Id. at 567 ("The reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides minimal evi-
dence that there is not now a national consensus against juvenile executions."). The dissent,
on the other hand, cited the reservation as evidence that there was no national consensus. Id.
at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("That the Senate and the President -those actors our Con-
stitution empowers to enter into treaties, see Art. II, § 2-have declined to join and ratify
treaties prohibiting execution of under-18 offenders can only suggest that our country has ei-
ther not reached a national consensus on the question, or has reached a consensus contrary
to what the Court announces. That the reservation to the ICCPR was made in 1992 does not
suggest otherwise, since the reservation still remains in place today.").
78. The Senate ratified the CAT with a number of understandings, which were then mirrored in
FARRA. Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-2761 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Essentially, FARRA made the CAT's terms en-
forceable in U.S. courts, which in turn required U.S. courts to interpret the CAT's under-
standings.
79. 395 F.3d 123, 142 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Thus, we are presented with a situation where both the
President and the Senate, the two institutions of the federal government with constitutional
roles in the treatymaking process, agreed during the ratification stage that their understand-
ing of the definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the [CAT] included a specific intent
requirement. In our view, this is enough to require that the understanding accompanying
the United States' ratification of the [CAT] be given domestic legal effect, regardless of any
contention that the understanding may be invalid under international norms governing the
formation of treaties or the terms of the [CAT] itself.").
8o. Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3 d lo9, 120 (2d Cit. 2007) ("By announcing its understandings, the
Senate implicitly recognized that the treaty wording would benefit from clarification. Those
understandings are the indispensable premise for the implementation of the CAT as domes-
tic law. The agency is bound by them, and we defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation
of them. . . .").
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asylum seekers to return to the country they fled, to mean "if it is more likely
than not that he would be tortured."" Such a definition is critical for determin-
ing whether a state has a legal obligation not to deport certain refugees or asy-
lum seekers. While in each of these cases the courts were applying FARRA, the
courts' unquestioning treatment of the CAT's understandings as legally dispos-
itive of FARRA's meaning suggests that the CAT's understandings are indeed
valid.
Courts interpreting and enforcing other prominent multilateral treaties
have also cited interpretative understandings and declarations in their deci-
sions. Most of these cases do not expressly rely on the RUDs in their ultimate
holdings, but a few have. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, for example, held that the use of herbicides did not constitute geno-
cide in part by referring to the U.S. interpretative understanding that specific
intent is required for genocide to be committed under the Genocide Conven-
tion.82 Similarly, in 1928, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
recognized that an interpretative understanding did not have to be a reserva-
tion to be binding." The court found that bilateral assent to the interpretative
understanding was sufficient.84 The court did not discuss what would happen
if the interpretative understanding was only a unilateral understanding, as dis-
cussed next.
B. Limitations of the Enforceability of RUDs in U.S. Courts
RUDs are therefore almost always enforced by U.S. courts. But there have
been a few discrete instances in which courts have questioned their use in spe-
81. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 985 (9 th Cit. 2012) ("The Senate ratified [the]
CAT with the understanding that the phrase, where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, would be understood to mean if it is
more likely than not that he would be tortured." (emphases added)). Such understandings have
also been applied by the district courts. See, e.g., Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d
198, 208-09 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that the applicant bore the burden of proving that "he
would 'more likely than not [ ] suffer intentionally-inflicted cruel and inhumane treatment'
in order to obtain relief under the CAT).
82. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
83. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 146 (D. Md. 1928), revd on other grounds, 32 F.2d 495
(4th Cit. 1929).
84. Id. at 154 (" [T]he plaintiffs very properly point out that the language quoted from the Sen-
ate Resolution is not, strictly speaking, a reservation on the part of the Senate, but an inter-
pretation of the meaning of the treaty, and that, subsequent to the Senate's action, the Presi-
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cific contexts. The significance of these few cases should not be overstated,
however, given that none of these cases invalidated a recognized RUD. The on-
ly opinions not giving effect to a RUD occurred where (1) the treaty condition
was never communicated to other treaty parties or (2) the reservation only ad-
dressed matters of domestic concern (although the case on this point is not
binding precedent, as it was vacated on other grounds). Two judges on the
First Circuit have questioned the validity of RUDs practice as a whole, but only
in dissenting opinions.
First, lower courts have raised questions about treaty conditions that were
not communicated to other parties and about subsequent interpretations not
supported by the treaty's text. For instance, the Federal Circuit and the Court
of Federal Claims both reasoned in separate decisions that a "Technical Expla-
nation" in a treaty could not be controlling where it appeared that only the
United States had been privy to the documents." Furthermore, the Court of
Federal Claims determined that it was unlikely that "at the time of Treaty ratifi-
cation" the United States contemplated the situation that had since occurred.8 6
It therefore found that the government's proposed interpretation could not be
read into the treaty, thereby in effect finding the purported RUD invalid and
unenforceable."
Second, in Power Authority v. Federal Power Commission, the D.C. Circuit re-
viewed a purported RUD attached to a treaty with Canada." In that RUD, the
United States reserved the right to develop its share of the Niagara River
through an act of Congress and prohibited redevelopment projects until oth-
erwise authorized through congressional enactment." The court did not give
effect to the reservation, holding that a reservation needed to reach an issue of
85. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, 656 (Fed. Cit. 1994) ("The government refers to
the affidavit of a Treasury employee and member of the United States negotiating team, Ste-
ven P. Hannes, who stated that 'copies of the Technical Explanation would have been sent to
the U.K. negotiators.' No evidence of such 'sending' was provided, and it must be assumed
that the Treasury's files contained no such support. On this extremely one-sided record, it
would violate any reasonable canon of construction to infer mutual assent by the signatories
to the position taken by the Treasury."); Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 58
Fed. Cl. 491, 499 (Fed. Cl. Ct. 2003) ("[E]ven if the court were to read these statements
more broadly, the unilateral views of the U.S. are not controlling. As noted above, the court
must give meaning to the intent of the treaty partners, not simply the views of the U.S.").
86. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 58 Fed. Cl. at 499.
87. Id.
88. Power Auth. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 538-42, 544 (D.C. Cit. 1957), vacated as
moot sub. nom. Am. Pub. PowerAss'nv. PowerAuth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957) (per curiam).
89. Id. at 539.
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international concern.90 The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the judgment,
remanding the decision "with directions to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the cause is moot."91 The D.C. Circuit's decision is therefore not valid prec-
edent, and other courts have not since followed its logic. However, though va-
cated, Power Authority may provide insight into the potential skepticism of
courts toward a reservation that does not pertain to relations with other states
or that otherwise alters the effect of the treaty with regard to any other party.92
The D.C. Circuit held that, in such instances, what appeared to be a reservation
was not in fact a formal reservation, given that it addressed issues of wholly
domestic concern.93
Finally, in Igartia-de la Rosa v. United States,94 two dissenting judges argued
that RUDs ought to be invalidated in light of the Supremacy Clause, which ex-
pressly establishes the priority of the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties
made under the "Authority of the United States" over other laws and legal in-
struments.9 5 Judge Torruella wrote, " [T] he United States is not in compliance
with the binding obligations it undertook by signing and ratifying the ICCPR.
The majority does not and cannot refute this undeniable fact, and ... the po-
tentially non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR does not preclude our ability
to make a declaration to that effect . ... Therefore, Judge Torruella would
have found that the United States' commitment to the treaty, as a supreme law,
takes priority over any reservation withholding obligations under the treaty.
Also dissenting, Judge Howard wrote that "separation of powers considera-
tions prevent a court from relying exclusively on the Senate's declaration ....
The Supremacy Clause and Article III require a court to examine independently
the intentions of the treatymakers to decide if a treaty, by its own force, creates
go. Id. at 542.
91. Am. Pub. PowerAss'n, 355 U.S. at 64.
92. Power Auth., 247 F.2d at 542. The court's reasoning in Power Authority suggests that a treaty
could be considered valid and enforceable even after a reservation was invalidated. The ma-
jority in Power Authority cited New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898), for the
proposition that a treaty could still bind the United States even if a reservation had been in-
validated, though how much such a holding could also apply beyond treaties with Native
American tribes remained unaddressed. PowerAuth., 247 F.2d at 543-44.
93. PowerAuth., 247 F.2d at 542.
94. 417 F.3d 145 (ist Cit. 2005) (en banc).
95. U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . .
96. Igartia-de Ia Rosa, 417 F.3d at 175 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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individually enforceable rights."" Judge Torruella expressed the same view-
point again five years later."
These continue to be minority viewpoints and have not been endorsed in
any binding decision by the First Circuit or any other U.S. court. Overall, the
isolation of these views in the case law indicates the robustness of RUDs in
U.S. courts. RUDs today are made public and communicated to other parties.
Neither Power Authority nor the dissenting opinions in the First Circuit consti-
tute binding law. The cases reviewed in this Section are therefore the excep-
tions, rather than the rule. U.S. courts can be expected to treat RUDs as valid
and enforceable.
III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF RUDS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS
The equivalents of RUDs, which are primarily discussed as a conglomerate
in U.S. contexts, in international law are reservations and interpretative decla-
rations. The International Law Commission's (ILC) Guide to Practice on Reser-
vations to Treaties provides helpful definitions that parallel those previously dis-
cussed in Part II. It defines a reservation as
a unilateral statement .. . made by a State or an international organiza-
tion when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of suc-
cession to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to ex-
clude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State or to that international organization."
Meanwhile, an interpretative declaration is a unilateral statement "made by
a State or an international organization, whereby that State or that organization
purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of certain of its
provisions."0 0
97. Id. at 185-86 (Howard, J., dissenting).
98. Igartda v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 625 (ist Cir. 2010) (Torruella, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("The Senate's declaration that the ICCPR is non-self-executing is
ultra vires with respect to the ratification process and as such that declaration is not binding
on the courts, who are required to exercise their independent judicial power under the Su-
premacy Clause in interpreting the meaning and import of all treaties entered into by the
United States.').
99. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, § 1.1, U.N. Doc. A/66/io/Add.i (2011).
ILC documents are not legally binding but are frequently treated as helpful interpretive
tools.
ioo. Id. § 1.2.
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For the purposes of distinguishing between these types, whether a state-
ment is formally titled a reservation or a declaration is less important than how
it operates. According to the ILC, " [t]he character of a unilateral statement as a
reservation or as an interpretative declaration is determined by the legal effect
that its author purports to produce," which should be determined by interpret-
ing the statement "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms, with a view to identifying therefrom the intention of its au-
thor, in light of the treaty to which it refers."o' Moreover, the abstract defini-
tions might not prove particularly helpful, given that the guidance essentially
involves a circular logic distinguishing the two terms using their own defini-
tions.
In this Part, I analyze international case law to determine the judicial en-
forceability of RUDs, namely reservations and interpretative declarations, in
international courts. To locate international cases engaging with RUDs, I con-
ducted searches using terms including "reservations," "declarations," and "in-
terpretative declarations."10 2 In total, approximately two dozen cases out of 300
cases reviewed were found to be relevant, and fourteen of those directly en-
gaged with the question of RUDs.103 I considered advisory opinions where the
principles discussed were directly relevant to RUDs, but I focused largely on
judgments given their binding authority.10 4
The international case law demonstrates that courts have also generally en-
forced RUDs. At the same time, international courts have warned that RUDs
could be invalidated where they fail the VCLT's "object and purpose" test, and
these courts have stopped short of enforcing certain RUDs where the relevant
101. Id. §§ 1.3-1-3.1; see also Edward T. Swaine, Treaty Reservations, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 277, 279 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) ("Reservations are classified by their at-
tempted effect rather than their billing; in the words of the [VCLT], a reservation 'purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application
to that State'. Reservations are thus distinguishable from two other devices that States fre-
quently deploy in consenting to treaties: (i) interpretative declarations (or 'understandings')
and (ii) (other) unilateral statements." (quoting VCLT, supra note 34, art. 2(1)(d), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 333).
102. The general term "RUDs" does not work in international court cases given that such a
grouping has not become a standard term outside of the United States.
103. Appendix A describes the methodology for this search, and Appendix B contains a complete
list of the cases reviewed and deemed relevant to the RUDs practice.
104. This Note restricted its review to binding court case law and therefore also did not place
weight on the opinions of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which provides helpful but
nonbinding advisory guidance including General Comment 24 on issues relating to
reservations made upon ratification or accession to treaties. General Comment 24 is
discussed infra Section IV.A.2. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment 24 (52), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment 24].
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treaties expressly limited their use. The ICJ cases, which are arguably most
prominent in discussing reservations and interpretative declarations, are dis-
cussed first, followed by cases from other international courts. Court decisions
that directly engaged with the question of RUDs were included in the case re-
view, although any case that involved RUDs was considered in the analysis.
This Part concludes with a discussion of the legal effect of objections by treaty
parties to RUDs adopted by other parties.
A. International Court of Justice (ICJ) Jurisprudence
According to Article 19 of the VCLT, reservations to treaties are permissible
with a few exceptions:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) [t]he reservation is pro-
hibited by the treaty; (b) [t]he treaty provides that only specified reser-
vations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be
made; or (c) . . . the reservation is incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty. 1s
The first two exceptions apply to specific treaty provisions, while the third is
generally applicable to all treaties and involves a court determination.106 Apply-
ing the third exception, international courts typically ask whether reservations
to treaties, where otherwise not prohibited, are compatible "with the object and
purpose of the treaty."o7 If the reservation is compatible, it is presumably valid
and should be upheld, and if it is not compatible, the reservation violates Arti-
cle 19 and is presumably invalid.
ICJ's early advisory opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention
adopted this "object and purpose" compatibility test for determining the validi-
ty of RUDs and established procedures for objections that would later be codi-
fied in the VCLT.10 s Since that opinion, the ICJ has established a number of
105. VCLT, supra note 34, at 336-37.
106. For a general history of how these conditions developed and the logic behind them, see
Christian Tomuschat, Admissibility and Legal Effects of Reservations to Multilateral Treaties:
Comments on Arts. 16 and 17 of the ILC's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 27 HEIDEL-
BERG J. INT'L L. 463 (1967) (Ger.).
107. VCLT, supra note 34, at 336-37.
1o8. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28) ("It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation
with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the atti-
tude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State
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principles on RUDs through binding judgments. In Fisheries Jurisdiction, the
ICJ explained that it will interpret a reservation in a "natural and reasonable"
way with regard to the intention of the reserving state when it ratified the trea-
ty.1 ' In Border and Transborder Armed Actions, the ICJ illustrated that a reserva-
tion can be distinguished from an interpretative declaration. In that case, the
ICJ cited a U.S. reservation to the Pact of BogotA limiting the ICJ's jurisdiction
as an indication that the Pact otherwise gave the court compulsory jurisdiction
over the case.110 Honduras, arguing that the Pact did not provide for compulso-
ry jurisdiction, attempted to suggest that the U.S. reservation was merely an
interpretative declaration and not reflective of the Pact's legal effect absent the
alleged declaration."' The ICJ disagreed, holding that the United States' ex-
press limitation on the court's jurisdiction was intended as a reservation, was
valid, and served as an indication that jurisdiction was otherwise compulso-
ry.112 The ICJ has since applied the object and purpose test to uphold a number
in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must guide every State in
the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissi-
bility of any reservation.").
iog. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432, ¶ 49 (Dec. 4) ("The Court
will thus interpret the relevant words of a declaration including a reservation contained
therein in a natural and reasonable way, having due regard to the intention of the State con-
cerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The intention
of a reserving State may be deduced not only from the text of the relevant clause, but also
from the context in which the clause is to be read, and an examination of evidence regarding
the circumstances of its preparation and the purposes intended to be served.").
11o. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, Jurisdiction and Ad-
missibility, 1988 I.C.J. 69, ¶ 38 (Dec. 20) ("[T]he United States, when signing the Pact,
made a reservation to the ffect that: 'The acceptance by the United States of the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement,
as provided in this Treaty, is limited by any jurisdictional or other limitations contained in
any Declaration deposited by the United States under Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute
of the Court, and in force at the time of the submission of any case."').
iii. Id. ("It is common ground between the Parties that if the Honduran interpretation of Article
XXXI of the Pact be correct, this reservation would not modify the legal situation created by
that Article, and therefore would not be necessary; Honduras argues however that it was not
a true reservation, but merely an interpretative declaration.").
112. Id. ¶ 39 (" [Honduras's] argument is inconsistent with the report, published by the United
States Department of State, of the delegation of that country to the Conference of Bogoti,
which stated that Article XXXI 'does not take into account the fact that various States in pre-
vious acceptances of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute,
have found it necessary to place certain limitations upon the jurisdiction thus accepted. This
was the case in respect to the United States, and since the terms of its declaration had, in ad-
dition, received the previous advice and consent of the Senate, the delegation found it neces-
sary to interpose a reservation to the effect that the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Court as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement is limited by any jurisdictional
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of reservations limiting jurisdiction of the court under the Genocide Conven-
tion. In Armed Activities, the ICJ held that Rwanda could make a reservation to
Article IX of the Genocide Convention limiting the ICJ's jurisdiction." The
ICJ relied on two preceding cases, Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United
States, in which the court had held as valid similar reservations by Spain and
the United States.114
While these holdings provide robust case law on the validity and enforcea-
bility of reservations within the ICJ's jurisprudence, some judges within the
court have argued in dissents that reservations that are compatible with the ob-
ject and purpose of a treaty may nonetheless be invalidated for other reasons.
In his dissent to Armed Activities, for example, Judge Koroma argued that reser-
vations that are incompatible with the raison d'&re of a treaty should be inva-
lid." Similarly, in Yugoslavia v. United States, Judge Kreda dissented to argue
that jus cogens norms can and must override inconsistent reservations.116 Judge
or other limitations contained in any declaration deposited by the United States under Arti-
cle 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the Court in force at the time of the submission of any
case."' (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
STATES, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, MARCH 30-MAY 2, 1948: REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS 48 (1948)); see Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1o6o.
113. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment,
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 20o6 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 67 (Feb. 3) ("Rwanda's reservation to Article
IX of the Genocide Convention bears on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect
substantive obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that Convention. In
the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reservation of
Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of settling a dispute re-
lating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is to be regarded as
being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.").
114. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslaviav. Spain), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 761, ¶¶ 32-33 (June
2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 916, ¶¶ 24-25 (June 2).
115. Armed Activities, 20o6 I.C.J. at 57, ¶ 11 (Koroma, J., dissenting) ("While a reservation to a
treaty clause concerning dispute settlement or the monitoring of the implementation of the
treaty is not, in itself, incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, it is incompat-
ible if the provision to which the reservation relates constitutes the raison d'tre of the trea-
ty." (citation omitted)).
16. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. at 963-65, ¶¶ 9-1o (Kreda, J., dissent-
ing) ("'Therefore, to the extent that any reservations to the Genocide Convention purport to
derogate from the scope or nature of any State's obligations in respect of genocide, as set out
in the core provisions of the Genocide Convention, those reservations would be void under
the jus cogens doctrine.' . . . The norms of jus cogens are of an overriding character; thus, they
make null and void any act, be it unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, which is not in accord-
ance with them." (quoting Martin M. Sychold, Ratification of the Genocide Convention: The
Legal Effects in Light of Reservations and Objections, 4 SwIss REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 533, 551
(1998))).
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Kreda clarified that he believed no difference exists between reservations and
understandings in such an inquiry."'
Generally, the ICJ has found that interpretative declarations are also valid,
at least to the extent they were agreed upon by the other parties to the treaty. In
the Ambatielos Case, the ICJ recognized an interpretative declaration as bind-
ing."' The court reasoned that it could be understood either by the instrument
of ratification or by necessary implication that the declaration must be consid-
ered provisions of the treaty."' Judge Carneiro, writing an individual opinion
in that case, referred explicitly to the declaration as an interpretative declaration
and explained that it was a binding component of the treaty.12 0
But one other case suggests that interpretative declarations can be chal-
lenged, at least when they act as reservations and are prohibited by treaties. In
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, the ICJ cast aside an interpretative decla-
ration.12 1 In that case, the ICJ was asked to consider a RUD adopted by Roma-
nia when it ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), a treaty that prohibits most reservations but allows certain inter-
117. Id.
118. Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, Preliminary Objection, 1952 I.C.J. 28, 44 (July
1) ("The intention of the Declaration was to prevent the new Treaty from being interpreted
as coming into full force in this sweeping manner and thus prejudicing claims based on the
older Treaty or the remedies provided for them. It follows that, for the proper interpretation
or application of the provisions of the Treaty of 1926, some such words as 'Save as provided
in the Declaration annexed to this Treaty' have to be read into Article 32 before the words 'It
shall come into force'. Thus, the provisions of the Declaration are in the nature of an inter-
pretation clause, and, as such, should be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty, even if
this was not stated in terms. For these reasons, the Court holds that either expressly (by vir-
tue of the United Kingdom's own instrument of ratification) or by necessary implication
(from the very nature of the Declaration) the provisions of the Declaration are provisions of
the Treaty within the meaning of Article 29.").
iig. Id.
120. Id. at 52-53 (opinion of Carneiro, J.) ("There is, however, I suppose, some doctrinal interest
in emphasizing the juridical nature of this Declaration. It is -it must be so described -
according to a current expression, an 'interpretative declaration'. Declarations of this sort are
often made by one of the parties concerned to define the attitude adopted towards a given
treaty, a method of executing it. In the British Year Book of International Law, Mr. A. B. Ly-
ons, referring to a declaration by the French Government on the most-favoured-nation
clause, observed that the competent court had 'held that the interpretative declaration must
be read with and deemed to form part of the text of the treaty and was binding on the
courts'. The Declaration of 1926, which has been referred to, was signed by the same repre-
sentatives of the two Governments who were signatories of the Treaty of the same date. It
has the significance of an authentic interpretation, embodied in the Treaty itself. The Treaty
consists of three parts -Articles, Customs Schedule and Declaration." (citations omitted)).
121 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 3).
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pretative declarations as long as they do not purport to exclude or modify the
legal effect of the convention.122 Romania had issued an interpretative declara-
tion regarding Article 121,123 which establishes the definition of an island as "a
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide" and distinguishes rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own in Article 121(3) as not having an exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf.124 The interpretative declaration allowed for a more
preferable delimiting boundary by not considering rocks as part of the delimi-
tation of maritime spaces. In a highly unfavorable decision for Romania, the
ICJ held that the declaration could not modify the legal effect of the UNCLOS
provisions. 125
At work in Black Sea and the invalidation of the alleged interpretative decla-
ration were two related provisions of UNCLOS: a prohibition on reservations
unless expressly permitted elsewhere in the treaty and the allowance of declara-
tions or statements as long as they do not exclude or modify the legal effect of
UNCLOS's provisions. It can be inferred that the latter provision ensures that
interpretative declarations will not simply masquerade as reservations; in this
instance, the ICJ explicitly relied on the latter in dismissing Romania's declara-
tion, plausibly doing so because it regarded the interpretative declaration as an
effort to evade that treaty's prohibition on reservations. In any case, while in-
122. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 309, Dec. io, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS] ("No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention
unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention."); id. art. 310 ("Article 309
does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from
making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the
harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided
that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect
of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State.").
123. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, 2009 I.C.J. at 76, ¶ 35 ("Romania states that accord-
ing to the requirements of equity -as it results from Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention on
the Law of the Sea -the uninhabited islands without economic life can in no way affect the
delimitation of the maritime spaces belonging to the mainland coasts of the coastal States."
(quoting Romania's declaration)).
124. UNCLOS, supra note 122, art. 121.
125. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, 2009 I.C.J. at 78, ¶ 42 ("Finally, regarding Romania's
declaration ... the Court observes that under Article 310 of UNCLOS, a State is not pre-
cluded from making declarations and statements when signing, ratifying or acceding to the
Convention, provided these do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the pro-
visions of UNCLOS in their application to the State which has made a declaration or state-
ment. The Court will therefore apply the relevant provisions of UNCLOS as interpreted in
its jurisprudence, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 23 May 1969. Romania's declaration as such has no bearing on the Court's inter-
pretation.").
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terpretative declarations might be subject to greater scrutiny for enforceability
than reservations, the Ambatielos Case is likely to be more representative of the
legal effect of interpretative declarations when they are not otherwise limited.
But Black Sea stands for the important principle that a treaty can restrict reser-
vations and interpretative declarations and thereby make them unenforceable
in international courts.
B. Other International Court Jurisprudence
With a few limited exceptions, other international courts have also found
reservations to be valid. But again, in a similar vein to Black Sea, courts make
exceptions when treaties include express limitations against certain types of
reservations. The various human rights courts, for instance, provide insight in-
to the use of reservations and declarations under the authority of specific hu-
man rights treaties with particular requirements.1 26 In the case law of these
courts, reservations that appear to violate the internal rules of the relevant trea-
ty, as well as understandings and declarations that appear to sidestep these lim-
itations, are invalidated and rendered unenforceable. For example, consistent
with Black Sea, an arbitral tribunal held that a Russian declaration excluding
certain disputes from court jurisdiction could be recognized but was limited by
the treaty's express description of which declarations would be permissible.127
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a court with particularly
express case law in this area, has invalidated reservations that do not conform
to the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Article 64 of the ECHR prohibits " [r]eservations of a general character" and
requires "a brief statement of the law concerned" for any reservation.128 The
ECtHR Grand Chamber explained that the Article limits the ability of States to
make reservations excluding areas of law from supervision by "Convention in-
stitutions," explaining that such prohibitions are necessary to ensure equality
126. For this reason, it is also important not to generalize or overemphasize the practices of hu-
man rights courts, which operate under particular treaties, to international court practice as
a whole.
127. In re Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction,
¶ 72 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1325 [http://
perma.cc/52SA-DV4R] ("Russia's Declaration cannot create an exclusion that is wider in
scope than what is permitted by article 29 8(1) (b).").
128. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 64, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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and unity among parties to maintain and recognize human rights.129 Relying
on this Article, the ECtHR has invalidated two Swiss reservations: one for not
conforming to the requirement to append a brief statement of the law con-
cerned,13 o and one about the meaning of a fair trial for being a reservation of a
general character."' In both cases, the ECtHR held that Switzerland was still
bound to the Convention.
Meanwhile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) con-
ducts a similar inquiry examining whether challenged reservations are compat-
ible with the American Convention on Human Rights, which allows reserva-
tions that are in conformity with the VCLT.132 Accordingly, the IACtHR has
invalidated reservations deemed to be incompatible with the Convention, alt-
hough its inquiry appears to be less searching than ECtHR's review.' Scruti-
129. Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶
77 (1995) ("In the Court's view, the existence of such a restrictive clause govern-
ing reservations suggests that States could not qualify their acceptance of the optional claus-
es thereby effectively excluding areas of their law and practice within their 'jurisdiction' from
supervision by the Convention institutions. The inequality between Contracting States
which the permissibility of such qualified acceptances might create would, moreover, run
counter to the aim, as expressed in the Preamble to the Convention, to achieve greater unity
in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights.").
130. Weber v. Switzerland, App. No. 11034/84, 170 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 38 (1990) ("Clearly
[the reservation] does not fulfil one of [the requirements of Article 64], as the Swiss Gov-
ernment did not append 'a brief statement of the law [or laws] concerned' to it. . . . Disre-
garding it is a breach not of 'a purely formal requirement' but of 'a condition of substance.'
The material reservation by Switzerland must accordingly be regarded as invalid." (citation
omitted)).
131. Belilos v. Switzerland, App. No. 10328/83, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 55, 60 (1988) ("The
words 'ultimate control by the judiciary over the acts or decisions of the public authorities
relating to [civil] rights or obligations or the determination of [a criminal] charge' do not
make it possible for the scope of the undertaking by Switzerland to be ascertained exactly, in
particular as to which categories of dispute are included and as to whether or not the 'ulti-
mate control by the judiciary' takes in the facts of the case. They can therefore be interpreted
in different ways, whereas Article 64 § 1 (art. 64-1) requires precision and clarity. In short,
they fall foul of the rule that reservations must not be of a general character. . . . In short, the
declaration in question does not satisfy two of the requirements of Article 64 (art. 64) of the
Convention, with the result that it must be held to be invalid. At the same time, it is beyond
doubt that Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective of the
validity of the declaration.").
132. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 75, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 ("This Convention shall be subject to reserva-
tions only in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties signed on May 23, 1969.").
133. See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
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nized reservations appear to be those that are "general in scope, which com-
pletely subordinate [] the application of the American Convention to the inter-
nal legislation of [a state] as decided by its courts."134  hen assessing a reser-
vation, the IACtHR has determined the reservation's meaning based on its text,
even when a state argues for a different understanding.' The ECtHR and
IACtHR have therefore endorsed the principle that treaties may place express
limitations on reservations and interpretative declarations, thereby invalidating
them at least when challenged before the specific courts tasked with enforcing
those conventions.
C. Formal Objections by a State to Another State's RUDs
Although not prominent in the case law, understanding RUDs in an inter-
national context also benefits from a brief mention of formal objections by a
state to another state's RUDs. In addition to establishing rules on when RUDs
are permissible, the VCLT provides procedures for these objections. Article 20
establishes that, under certain conditions, consent by all parties to a given res-
ervation is not always required for a treaty to enter into force, such as when the
treaty expressly authorizes reservations. It notes that "[a] reservation expressly
authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other
2, ¶ 37 (Sept. 24, 1982) ("Having concluded that reservations expressly authorized by Article
75, that is, reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, do not
require acceptance by the States Parties, the Court is of the opinion that the instruments of
ratification or adherence containing them enter into force, pursuant to Article 74, as of the
moment of their deposit.").
134. Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 81,
¶¶ 82, 88 (Sept. 1, 2001) ("Interpreting the Convention in accordance with its object and
purpose, the Court must act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the mechanism pro-
vided for in Article 62(1) of the Convention. It would be unacceptable to subordinate the
said mechanism to restrictions that would render the system for the protection of human
rights established in the Convention and, as a result, the Court's jurisdictional role, inopera-
tive.").
135. Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, ¶ 17 (Nov. 20, 2007) ("The Court has previously considered that 'a
State reserves no more than what is contained in the text of the reservation itself.' In this
case, the text of the reservation does not explicitly state whether a sentence of death is man-
datory for the crime of murder, nor does it address whether other possible methods of exe-
cution or sentences are available under Barbadian law for such a crime. Accordingly, the
Court finds that a textual interpretation of the reservation entered by Barbados at the time
of ratification of the American Convention clearly indicates that this reservation was not in-
tended to exclude from the jurisdiction of this Court neither the mandatory nature of the
death penalty nor the particular form of execution by hanging. Thus the State may not avail
itself of this reservation to that effect." (footnote omitted)).
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contracting States unless the treaty so provides."136 Furthermore, there is gen-
erally a twelve-month period for objecting to a reservation, after which other
parties' tacit acceptance to a reservation will be assumed."' Article 21 lays out
the conditions under which reservations and objections to reservations will
have legal effect. When a state objects to another state's reservation but other-
wise does not object to the treaty entering into force, the provisions to which
the reservation relates will not apply between the two State parties to the extent
of the reservation.1 3 8
While rare, states do object to other states' reservations. A small but not in-
significant number of states have objected to U.S. reservations to multilateral
treaties, including objections from three states to U.S. reservations to the
CAT.1 3 9 The Netherlands, for instance, objected to the U.S. reservation to Arti-
cle 16 of the CAT as incompatible with the CAT's object and purpose and to the
U.S. interpretation of "torture" under Article 1 as invalid.140 Similarly, eleven
states objected to U.S. reservations to the ICCPR.14 1 Germany, for instance, ob-
jected to the U.S. reservation to Article 6, which allows capital punishment for
those under the age of eighteen.142
There is no indication in the reviewed case law that any U.S. or interna-
tional court has ever cited a documented objection by another state as a dis-
positive factor in invalidating a RUD. Litigants have raised other states' objec-
tions to U.S. RUDs in U.S. courts,14 3 but these objections have not been treated
136. VCLT, supra note 34, art. 20, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
137. Id. (" [A] reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no
objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of
the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty,
whichever is later.").
138. Id. art. 21 ("When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of
the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation re-
lates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.").
139. Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden objected. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION 8-21
, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%2o1/Chapter%2olV/I-9.en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4RMJ-VG38].
140. Id. at 15.
141. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden objected. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NA-
TIONs TREATY COLLECTION 14-33, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG
/Volume%2o1/Chapter%2olV/IV-4.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/M33T-5QVK].
142. Id. at 21.
143. See, e.g., Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Auguste also contends more
generally that an understanding 'that conflicts with those of other signatory states [is] of lit-
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as a basis for rejecting a RUD. The issue has not arisen for the United States in
the international court cases reviewed, leaving unsettled exactly how much le-
gal force these objections have.
IV. REVISITING THE USE OF AND CONCERNS OVER RUDS
The case analysis presented in these preceding two Parts offers an im-
portant point of reference to the recurring debate and concerns introduced at
the outset of this Note: RUDs are usually held to be valid and enforceable in
courts of law. They are likely only to be vulnerable when international courts
consider treaties that limit their use. These findings suggest that the dominant
concern in United States treatymaking over the domestic legal effects of RUDs
is in fact misguided. The overwhelming attention that has been paid to ensur-
ing that RUDs will be enforceable to prevent unintended domestic conse-
quences should instead be devoted to concerns over the international effects,
ones that this case analysis suggests are rooted in preventing RUDs that un-
dermine treaty obligations. Granted, the robustness of RUDs in U.S. courts in-
dicates that they are not going anywhere any time soon; if they are enforceable,
there is little reason to think that the United States, or other states, will stop
using them. But these findings encourage reorienting the concerns over the
effects of using RUDs and determining their optimal scope in the treatymaking
process.
More specifically, both legal scholars and government officials can now ad-
dress one another's concerns with the added benefit of a better understanding
of actual RUDs enforceability, as provided by this Note's case analysis. As this
Part argues, legal scholars should consider and address the concerns over do-
mestic legal effects of RUDs that the U.S. government has raised, as this case
analysis attempted to initiate, and the U.S. government should consider the re-
al concerns that legal scholars have raised about the international effects, in-
formed by their consistent enforceability in domestic courts and the limited ex-
ceptions to enforceability in international courts. Section IV.A encourages
recasting the U.S. perspective and priorities on RUDs, namely to focus on the
international instead of the domestic effects of these instruments, and Section
IV.B presents recommendations based on this reorientation.
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A. Recasting the U.S. Perspective and Priorities on RUDs
In light of the preceding case analysis, U.S. senators and other government
officials should take solace in the fact that RUDs have and will most likely con-
tinue to have the force of law, at least in U.S. courts and in most instances in
international courts. If RUDs are enforceable, the United States and other
states have little reason to stop using them. But that fact alone should not dis-
courage those who are skeptical about the extensive use of RUDs. Rather, it is
this awareness of the robust enforceability of RUDs that encourages a reexami-
nation of the optimal scope of RUDs. The question is no longer whether RUDs
are enforceable, but rather when RUDs are adopted, what is their ideal usage?
More specifically, the questions raised by senators over the Disabilities
Convention should be reformulated. Rather than question whether RUDs can
be drafted to insulate the United States from certain treaty obligations - they
can, and they do -we should ask whether RUDs will be sustainable in a trea-
tymaking system that is increasingly wary of treaty ratification using RUDs.
The effects of RUDs usage are both domestic and international, and yet they
have not been considered in detail. This Section begins by exploring the do-
mestic effects of RUDs' enforceability and then pivots to the international
effects, namely their undermining of the treatymaking process and the possible
risk of the proliferation of no-reservation treaty provisions.
1. Reorienting from the Domestic Effects of RUDs
U.S. senators have long been concerned about the possibility that treaty rat-
ification could create domestic responsibilities and liabilities that impinge on
the United States' sovereignty and ability to determine its own obligations
through domestic legislation. To that end, the use of RUDs to promote treaty
ratification has been significant, especially in multilateral treaties, such as the
various international human rights treaties that have been considered in the
post-World War II era. In the 195os, Senator Bricker proposed a constitutional
amendment hat would make "[a] treaty ... effective in the United States only
through legislation which would be valid in the absence of [a] treaty," effective-
ly placing a permanent RUD on all treaties that would render every one of
them non-self-executing.144 The amendment eventually failed, but not without
a significant cost to treaty ratification: acquiescing to the political forces back-
ing the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower Administration essentially
144. Henkin, supra note 3, at 348.
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pledged to steer the United States away from human rights treaties.145 Since
then, the most prominent multilateral treaties, including the CAT and the IC-
CPR, have only been ratified through RUDs, including non-self-executing dec-
larations akin to that proposed in Senator Bricker's amendment.
The United States did not always focus exclusively on unintended domestic
effects. For instance, when the Senate debated ratification of the Genocide
Convention in the 198os, some senators challenged a reservation that recog-
nized the supremacy of the Constitution. The senators noted that there was no
evidence that the Convention would conflict with the Constitution, that the
Constitution in any case would be supreme over a treaty, that it was "disturbing
to our allies who have undertaken an unqualified acceptance of the treaty's ob-
ligations," and that the "self-serving nature of the reservation suggested that
the United States 'was not ratifying the ... Convention in good faith.'1 4 6 The
senators concluded:
[The] reservation ... will seriously compromise the political and moral
prestige the United States can otherwise attain in the world community
by unqualified ratification of the Genocide Convention. It will hand our
adversaries a propaganda tool to use against the United States and in-
vite other nations to attach similar self-judging reservations that could
be used to undermine treaty commitments.14 7
145. Hearings Before Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 1 Proposing an Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive
Agreements and S.J. Res. 43 Proposing an Amendment o the Constitution of the United States Re-
lating to the Legal EJfect of Certain Treaties, 83d Cong. 825 (1953) (statement of John Foster
Dulles, Sec'y of State); Hathaway, supra note 13, at 1303 ("The Amendment was ultimately
defeated by a margin of only a single vote, largely thanks to a vigorous campaign against it
by President Dwight Eisenhower. Yet Eisenhower paid a price for this success. He agreed
not to accede to the emerging human rights conventions."); see also Hathaway, supra, at 1302
("Why the backlash against the Treaty Clause? There were several reasons -the emergence
of the Cold War, the growing hegemony of the United States, and rising isolationism,
among others. Yet even more central than the geopolitical backdrop was an emerging back-
lash against the human rights revolution that had been led by the United States -a backlash
that continues to inspire opposition to international law in the United States even today."
(footnote omitted)).
146. CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 132 (documenting disagreements in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee deliberations in 1985 on ratification conditions to the Geno-
cide Convention) (quoting S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. ExEc. REP. No. 99-2,
at 4 (1985)).
147. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. ExEc. REP. No. 99-2, at 31 (1985).
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Notwithstanding this criticism, the reservation ultimately passed the Senate by
a vote of 83-11 on February 19, 1986.148
This focus on the international effects of RUDs has not won out. Since that
contentious battle, the concerns over the possible unintended domestic effects
of treaty ratification without RUDs continue to overshadow the concerns over
their international effects. As the various ratified and non-ratified treaties dis-
cussed here illustrate, the United States has mostly confined itself to one of two
approaches: (1) ratify a treaty with RUDs or (2) not ratify treaties at all. Nei-
ther is objectively preferable. 149
Indeed, if one extreme is using RUDs for a much more conditional, argua-
bly substance-less ratification, and the other extreme is restricting the practice
of RUDs and inevitably limiting participation in multilateral treaties altogeth-
er,1s0 the United States has been at both extremes but rarely between them.
Fueling the United States' practices at the extremes appears to be a general lack
of any real consideration of the effect that RUDs would have on the United
States' relations with other states and the wider international community. Sen-
ators have mostly concerned themselves with whether the treaty would have
the domestic implications they seek (e.g., will the RUD be enforced?), thereby
forgoing an analysis of the costs and benefits of using RUDs (e.g., could the
United States be hindering commitments to human rights by providing such
detached, conditional consent o international treaties?).
But this Note's case analysis suggests that the United States should be oper-
ating in the middle. Concerns over the unintended domestic effects of treaties
are exaggerated. Domestic courts will enforce RUDs. They have done so con-
sistently over the years, and there is no indication that they will cease to do so.
The United States government should therefore be concerned with the interna-
tional implications of placing reservations on treaty provisions, both for the
sake of international appearance and the effects on the behavior of other states.
It should consider the international court jurisprudence, which might shape
the contours of treaty enforcement in international law. Moreover, the United
States should take into account how the drafting of treaties could be changing
over time.
148. CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 133.
149. For instance, some treaty supporters have wished the United States never ratified certain
treaties at all because of the RUDs that it had attached. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 31, at
1181 ("ICCPR supporters include those who because of the reservations attached to it, would
have preferred that the United States not ratify it.").
150. See generally CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 42 ("A major challenge was the
pressure to approve a multilateral treaty without reservation because of the large number of
nations that had been involved and the difficulty of renegotiation.").
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2. Reorienting Toward the International Effects of RUDs
In short, the more pressing concerns are the international effects of RUDs.
Indeed, while certainly not the only country to use RUDs,1s1 the United States
has been the target of intense criticism from the international community for
its use of RUDs, particularly in human rights treaties.152 Again, a generous
reading of the United States' use of RUDs is that the United States aims for au-
thenticity in its treatymaking process by only ratifying treaties in forms in
which the United States would actually abide by them, while a less generous
reading argues that the RUDs are a sign of arrogance.' Some scholars suspect
the latter to be more likely.154 The reality, accepted even by proponents of
RUDs, is that RUDs at the very least influence perceptions that can have sig-
nificant consequences in international relations.' States may face bacldash for
151. See Gamble, Jr., supra note 7, at 377 tbl.1, 381-83 tbl.4 (documenting 691 reservations made
to treaty commitments between 1919 and 1971 and listing over fifty states with reservations
to treaties for the same period).
152. See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 177 (1999) ("Human rights
advocates have consistently criticized the practice of attaching numerous RUDs to U.S. in-
struments of ratification for human rights treaties, claiming that the conditional nature of
U.S. adherence demonstrates that the United States does not take its treaty obligations seri-
ously." (footnote omitted)).
153. See, e.g., Brad R. Roth, Understanding the "Understanding": Federalism Constraints on Human
Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 891, 909-lo (2001) ("Whether the RUDs represent
due regard for time-tested and authentically American institutions and practices, or merely
the arrogance of a superpower that exempts itself from the accommodation of international
sensibilities that it demands of other states, will long be debated. Either way, examination of
the RUDs might well cause one to reflect on the possibility that the foreigners whom we
routinely criticize for human rights shortcomings are no more doggedly attached to their in-
stitutions and practices than we are to our own.").
154. See, e.g., Yogesh Tyagi, The Conflict ofLaw and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Trea-
ties, 71 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 256 (2000) ("To promote their universalization, human
rights treaties will continue to have uncomfortable alliances with reservations; and human
rights bodies will remain suspicious of reservations. This paradox does not pose any serious
problem as long as human rights treaties tolerate reservations and the latter do not damage
the integrity of the former. But States have not always respected the integrity of treaties;
some of their reservations offend certain non-derogable rights, customary rules, or peremp-
tory norms of international law. Invariably, reservations reduce the rights of individuals,
weaken the shield available against errant State authorities and check the growth of human
rights law. By their conditional acceptance of treaty obligations, the reserving States tend to
develop a false sense of security at the cost of their international image and the best interests
of their citizens.").
155. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 418-19 ("We cannot, and do not, claim that
the U.S. RUDs practice has no effect whatsoever on international affairs. If nothing else,
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their practices, and the aspiration of securing an international order that re-
spects treaty commitments may falter.
Indeed, various international movements have arisen out of frustration
with the United States and other states' practices of using RUDs. One promi-
nent example is General Comment 24, which was promulgated by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in 1994.156 Recognizing that
forty-six states had entered 150 reservations to the ICCPR, the UNHRC ex-
pressed concern that the reservations' "content and their scope may undermine
the effective implementation of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for
the obligations of States parties.""' In that comment and thereafter, the UN-
HRC assumed a duty to determine whether specific reservations to the ICCPR
are permissible by reviewing them under the VCLT's "object and purpose" test.
While the comment was a forceful reaction to RUDs, the UNHRC does not
have any enforcement authority for its decisions and therefore can only have a
limited impact in curtailing the use of RUDs.1ss
A more direct, potentially fomenting international movement suggested by
the case analysis is a pattern of treaty drafters expressly banning RUDs in part
or altogether. While scholars have rarely discussed them,5 9 no-reservation
clauses-and related treaty provisions limiting RUDs-first appeared on the
U.S. Senate's radar decades ago.160 Over the years, they elicited concerns in the
United States,16 1 particularly in the area of environmental treaties,162 but they
RUDs probably feed the suspicion in some circles that the United States is an arrogant su-
perpower that disdains international aw. We have tried to show that the premise of this
complaint-that the U.S. RUDs practice shows disrespect for international law-is much
less warranted than conventional wisdom suggests. Perceptions do, however, matter in in-
ternational relations and this perception, warranted or not, might influence the international
human rights movement.").
156. General Comment 24, supra note 104.
157. Id. ¶ 1.
158. See, e.g., Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Hu-
man Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 277 (1999) (reviewing the history and scope of
General Comment 24).
159. One exception is Swaine, who provides a brief discussion of their efficacy for negotiating
treaties. Swaine, supra note 22, at 332.
16o. See, e.g., CRS REPORT ON TREATIES, supra note 45, at 175 ("A related practice that has begun
to occur with increasing frequency is the inclusion in some multilateral agreements of provi-
sions barring reservations. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has protested that
no-reservation clauses intrude on the Senate's constitutional prerogatives but, nonetheless,
has given its advice and consent to a number of such treaties." (footnotes omitted)).
161. Id. at 42 (quoting S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CON-
VENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, S. ExEc. REP. No. 102-55, at 15 (1992)) ("Some multilateral
treaties have contained an article prohibiting conditions. The Senate Foreign Relations
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have mostly been underestimated. In the 199os, three environmental treaties -
the Basel Convention, the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, and
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change -all prohibit-
ed reservations, eliciting concerns from members of the Senate.163 Senators
who provided advice and consent for these treaties emphasized their concern
over no-reservation clauses,164 and they clarified that their approval should not
be construed as precedent for consenting to such clauses in future agree-
ments.165 If more treaties feature these no-reservation clauses, these past events
suggest that the United States will increasingly find it difficult to sign onto
other treaties, even those it finds particularly important.
And it does appear that more treaties are featuring these no-reservation
clauses.16 6 The Statute of the International Criminal Court, Comprehensive
Committee has said that its approval of these treaties should not be construed as a precedent
for such clauses in future treaties. In the committee's view, 'The President's agreement to
such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give
its advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might determine is required by
the national interest."); see also id. at 175 (citing the Senate's objections to no-reservation
clauses including when providing advice and consent to the Inter-American Convention on
Sea Turtles and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Conservation and Manage-
ment of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks).
162. Id. at 15 ("Although supportive of environmental cooperation treaties, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has expressed concern about articles prohibiting reservations and has
cautioned that consent to three multilateral environmental treaties containing such articles
should not be construed as a precedent.").
163. Id. at 274.
164. See, e.g., id. at 275 ("On August II, 1992, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the Basel
Convention with four understandings requested by the administration. In presenting the
treaty to the Senate, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, stat-
ed his concern about including in treaties a provision which has the effect of inhibiting the
Senate from attaching reservations deemed necessary or of preventing the Senate from exer-
cising its right to give its advice and consent to all treaty commitments before they can have
a binding effect. He said the Senate's approval of these treaties 'should not be construed as a
precedent for such clauses in future agreements with other nations requiring the Senate's
advice and consent." (footnote omitted)).
i6S. Id. at 16 ("Some multilateral treaties have contained an article prohibiting reservations. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken the position that the executive branch nego-
tiators should not agree to this prohibition. The Senate has given its advice and consent to a
few treaties containing the prohibition, but the committee has stated that approval of these
treaties should not be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future treaties. It has fur-
ther stated that the President's agreement to such a clause could not constrain the Senate's
right and obligation to attach reservations to its advice and consent.").
166. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Reservations to Treaties and United States Practice, ASIL INSIGHTS
(May 4, 2003), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/11/reservations-treaties-and
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Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Anti-Personnel
Mines Convention, along with a number of environmental treaties, including
the Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, Rotterdam Convention, Stockholm
Convention, and Cartagena Protocol, all ban reservations.16 7 Indeed, more re-
cent treaties may be drafted using the language in UNCLOS, such as the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the World Health Organiza-
tion's proposed Framework Convention for Tobacco Control.168 Some have ex-
plained that no-reservation clauses, including for UNCLOS, are meant to pro-
tect "package deals" where there are so many compromises that any reservation
on particular clauses or the entire treaty could unhinge the agreement.169 Since
they are written into the treaties themselves, they very well might take prece-
dent over a RUD, as Black Sea and the cases from the ECtHR and IACtHR
suggest. Indeed, one of the reasons the United States has not ratified UNCLOS
is because of the provisions on deep seabed mining that could not be avoided
through the use of RUDs.170
What could this portend for the United States? If states begin to find the
United States' use of RUDs in important treaties more inappropriate and its
ratification less important, treaty drafters may be more likely to pass no-
reservation provisions that limit the use of RUDs, thereby leaving the United
States behind in the treatymaking process. In other words, if the United States
unnecessarily concerns itself with the enforceability of its RUDs, other mem-
bers of the international community could meanwhile continue to design
RUDs-limiting treaties that risk foreclosing U.S. participation. Indeed, even as
the United States ratifies fewer treaties, other states continue to sign and ratify
-united-states-practice [http://perma.cc/2CRR-MFJY] ("In recent years, several important
multilateral conventions have prohibited most or all reservations.").
167. See Bradford C. Smith, Reservations and Declaration: Training Materials Delivered in Monrovia,
Liberia, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (July 11-14, 20o6), http://treaties.un.org
/doc/source/training/regional/2oo6/1o_12-14July-2oo6/reservations and-declarations.ppt
[http://perma.cc/QKR8-ED3S].
168. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 120, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
("No reservations may be made to this Statute."); World Health Org. [WHO], WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 30 (2003) (entered into force Feb. 27,
2005), http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHOFCTC-english.pdf [http://perma
.cc/QCK7-2PGA] ("No reservations may be made to this Convention.").
169. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Response, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty
Design, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 367 (20o6) (explaining how treatymakers could etermine which
provisions should be subject to reservations); Swaine, supra note 22, at 332-33 (explaining
how no-reservation clauses are a product of "package deals").
170. Kirgis, supra note 166 ("The United States is not a party to [UNCLOS], largely because of
the provisions on deep seabed mining to which reservations could not be made.").
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contemporary multilateral treaties, with UNCLOS (168 parties)1 7 ' and the
Disabilities Convention (167 parties)172 among them.
Scholars and government officials have downplayed these concerns in a va-
riety of ways. One common response is that many of these concerns of outward
appearance are exaggerated because the United States helps draft treaties and
already ends up following the general framework of many treaties even if it de-
cides not to ratify them.1 73 There is indeed a significant debate over whether
treaty ratification makes a difference in compliance and whether other methods
may be more effective in leading to change.174 Regardless of where one stands
on the efficacy of the treaty regime as a whole, the reality is that key areas of in-
ternational law remain solely under the purview of treaties, and the United
States has shown enough interest to continue treaty deliberations for many
treaties. Its dance around certain treaties and their provisions at the ratification
stage therefore undermines what appears to be its supposedly genuine com-
mitment to many treaties' principles. The robust domestic court jurisprudence
discussed here indicates that this dance is unnecessary and self-defeating. Be-
cause the United States will in almost all circumstances be bound insofar as it
intends to be for any ratified treaty, the benefits of formally joining the interna-
tional community in supporting the treaty's principles it already aims to follow
is likely to outweigh the costs of not doing so.
Another response is that no-reservation clauses and their potential to be en-
forced in international courts are irrelevant because the United States is not be-
171. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
1, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%2o11/Chapter%2oXXI/XXI-6
.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/2GVJ-37UZ].
172. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
1, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%2o1/Chapter%2olV/V-15.en
.pdf [http://perma.cc/TTN2-PB9T].
173. See, e.g., HEARING ON THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, su-
pra note 2, at 37 (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake, Member, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations) ("I
am persuaded that the adoption of strong reservations, understandings, and declarations
could address sovereignty concerns that have been raised with regard to United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I am not, however, persuaded that
the ratification of this treaty would provide the United States with a moral high ground that
we currently lack. As the United States is the leader on disabilities policy in the world, I'm
not certain higher ground is even a possibility.").
174. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 54 DuIE L.J. 621 (2004) (discussing methods of coercion, persua-
sion, and acculturation whereby states might influence the behavior of other states); Oona
A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (con-
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holden to the judgments of international courts. Indeed, the United States has
continued to refuse the compulsory jurisdiction of international courts, includ-
ing the ICJ,"' and any change to this trajectory does not appear to be forth-
coming.176 But not recognizing the jurisdiction of international courts does not
absolve the United States from considering how those court decisions may in-
fluence the actions and positions of other states and treaty drafters. Further-
more, these international court decisions may also increasingly be considered
or reflect customary international law, including decisions relating to the scope
and expectations of the VCLT. If the United States cannot act within the
bounds of accepted international law when ratifying treaties, its stature in the
fields of arms control, human rights, and other areas relying upon multilateral
treaties risks being diminished.
In short, rather than invite backlash from the international community, and
even apart from the many other possible benefits of supporting a robust inter-
national order of treatymaking, the United States can and should aspire toward
more substantive participation in the ratification process. This shift is especially
imperative given the lack of any significant domestic tradeoffs. Whether the
United States can continue to hold off from multilateral treaties without risk-
ing unwanted exclusion is simply an unnecessary gamble. The United States
would be wise to limit its RUDs to the extent they are absolutely necessary and
to otherwise avoid their overuse given that there are few upsides for any alter-
native. The next Section elaborates on these recommendations.
B. Navigating the Effects of RUDs by Limiting Their Overuse
Considering an optimal use of RUDs is an important step to ensuring their
sustainability and effectiveness. Members of the ILC, for instance, have contin-
175. Facing a lawsuit that was eventually decided against the United States in Military and Para-
military Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27), the United States terminated its compulsory jurisdiction under the ICJ. See also Letter
from George P. Shultz, Sec'y of State, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, Sec'y-Gen., United Nations,
United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Ac-
ceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
176. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 3, at 345 ("To date, there has been no new declaration by the
United States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The executive branch has
repeatedly denied that it fears impartial judgment and is hostile to the Court, noting that the
United States has accepted the Court's jurisdiction in more than seventy treaties; but the
United States has now repeatedly refused to add to that number the few human rights con-
ventions that contain an ICJ clause.").
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ued to debate how RUDs should be addressed,"' including by publishing a
guide explaining reservations in 2011.2" The guide was drafted with the inten-
tion of assisting practitioners and therefore consists of nonbinding recommen-
dations rather than peremptory norms."' Like the ILC, the United States
should take these concerns into account and develop a more systematic method
for determining when RUDs are appropriate. Turning first to some general
principles for the United States, this Section then proposes two major recom-
mendations: (1) limiting the scope of RUDs and (2) limiting the use of RUDs.
At the outset, the United States should recognize as illustrated by this
Note's case analysis that any limitation to the use of RUDs will not come from
U.S. courts, where deference to the U.S. Senate and its RUDs practice remains
strong. With the judicial branch largely out of the picture and the President
bound to RUDs adopted by the Senate, the Senate holds the keys to the future
of RUDs practice. Second, as the Senate ponders its practice, it should note the
potential pushback from treaty drafters, who may increasingly limit RUDs, and
international courts, which appear willing to enforce these limitations. As pre-
viously discussed, given the limited benefits and significant costs associated
with RUDs, the United States should avoid overplaying its hand and refrain
from overusing them.
The Disabilities Convention provides a helpful illustration. As the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee noted in its report, the Disabilities Convention
permits reservations, "provided that they are not incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention."8 0 Accordingly, when U.S. senators debated
the advice and consent of the Convention in the Senate Foreign Relations
177. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, On Human Rights Treaties, Contractual Conceptions and Reservations, in
RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME 149, 151
(Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004) ("[M]ore than once has the idea been proclaimed that somehow[]
the Vienna Convention's regime on reservations ought to be reconsidered, reworked and re-
thought. Since the mid-199os, this is indeed what has happened and is happening. The ILC
itself has re-opened the discussion by placing the topic of reservations back on its agenda."
(footnote omitted)).
178. See Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 99.
179. See Alain Pellet, The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties: A General Presentation by
the Special Rapporteur, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. lo61 (2013). The ILC Guide has been the subject of
some criticism for not having had any real effect on changing RUDs practice. See, e.g., Kasey
L. McCall-Smith, Mind the Gaps: The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Human Rights
Treaties, 16 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 263, 264 (2014) ("However, following the 2011 publi-
cation of the ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties . . . it is apparent that despite
several progressive guidelines, little has changed in the context of reservations to human
rights treaties.").
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Committee, they proposed several RUDs. The reservations were summarized
in the report under three areas:
Federalism. The first reservation addresses federalism issues. Article 4(1)
of the Convention states that the provisions of the Convention "shall
extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or excep-
tions." Because certain provisions of the treaty concern matters tradi-
tionally governed by state law rather than federal law, and because in
very limited instances some state and local standards are less vigorous
than the convention would require, a reservation is required to preserve
the existing balance between federal and state jurisdiction over these
matters.
Non-Regulation of Private Conduct. The second reservation concerns the
extent of the United States obligations under the Convention with re-
gard to private conduct. Although the United States generally and
broadly applies nondiscrimination laws to private entities with respect
to operation in public spheres of life, some laws set a threshold before
their protections are triggered. . . . Accordingly, a reservation is required
to make clear that the United States does not accept any obligation un-
der the Convention to enact legislation or take any other measures with
respect to private conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and
laws of the United States. The committee notes that in a written re-
sponse for the record, the Department of State and the Department of
Justice confirmed that in light of this reservation, ratification of the
Disabilities Convention would not impose any new requirements on
employers exempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Torture, Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment. The third reservation
concerns the extent of the United States obligations under Article 15
(Freedom from Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment). As Article 15 of the Convention covers the same subject
matter as Articles 2 and 16 of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, the third reservation makes clear that the obligations of the
United States under Article 15 of the Convention shall be subject to the
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same reservations and understandings that apply to U.S. ratification of
those two treaties. 181
All three reservations stem from the concerns that were raised in Bond
about the overreach of a treaty, and the second reservation in essence leaves the
Disabilities Convention to have the same effect as the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act,182 a federal statute aimed at protecting persons with disabilities against
discrimination. These are not unusual reservations, and consistent with the
cases reviewed in Parts II and III, they are likely to be enforced in a domestic or
international court.
The RUDs should go no further. Given what this Note uncovers about the
jurisprudence of RUDs, whether the drafting of RUDs will preserve their en-
forcement should not be the limiting factor on a treaty's ratification. The Disa-
bilities Convention should be considered on its own merits, and the focus
should be on whether the RUDs fulfill the United States' mission to protect
persons with disabilities rather than whether domestic courts will enforce them
as drafted. Focusing on whether an overly limited RUD will cause improper
enforcement of a treaty distracts from the real issue at hand-whether the
United States is truly committed to the provisions of the Convention.
But if the Disabilities Convention is an obvious example of a case where
U.S. senators should relax their approach to RUDs, UNCLOS provides an il-
lustration of the limits of that reassurance. Perhaps an implicit reaction to the
weakness of the "object and purpose" prohibition found and circumvented in
many treaties, UNCLOS goes further than the standard VCLT limitation. The
Convention provides that " [n] o reservations or exceptions may be made to this
Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.""'
Reservations are essentially off the table.
As the preceding Section explained, the real threat to ongoing RUDs prac-
tice stems not from the courts but from treaty drafters who might increasingly
push for RUD-restrictive provisions. Such reactionary measures may not im-
mediately risk U.S. interests, given the American refusal to sign on to the juris-
diction of international courts and the uncertainty that U.S. courts would ever
enforce a treaty provision that restricts RUDs. But as previously discussed, the
longer-term effects of overreliance on RUDs remain unknown. The overuse of
RUDs might contribute to further restrictions over time, whether through
treaty provisions or within international courts, and the U.S. Senate may be
181. Id. at 21-22.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2012).
183. UNCLOS, supra note 122, art. 309.
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forced to ratify fewer treaties unless it changes its RUDs practice. Expanding
upon the Disabilities Convention example, this Section proposes two general
recommendations for addressing the role of RUDs in the United States' trea-
tymaking process: (1) limiting the scope of RUDs and (2) limiting the use of
RUDs.
1. Limiting the Scope of RUDs
Again, this Note's case analysis indicates that the possible threat of unin-
tended treaty consequences in domestic courts is minimal: in almost every in-
stance, domestic courts will not challenge RUDs. Given the lack of any domes-
tic threat to their invalidation, the U.S. Senate would be wise to consider how
RUDs could be limited to instances in which they are necessary and where they
optimize the benefits of treaty ratification.
As discussed in Part II, this Note has recognized a number of latent limita-
tions on RUDs enforceability under domestic law: (1) the condition must have
some relationship to the treaty; (2) the Senate cannot use its conditional con-
sent power to alter pre-existing federal law; and (3) the Senate's conditional
consent power should be limited to the extent that it unduly impinges on the
prerogatives of the other branches of the federal government. These limita-
tions, while important to note, are focused on ensuring that the United States
does not create conflicts for itself. The first and second, for instance, are limita-
tions designed to avoid the situation in Power Authority, where a possible RUD
was invalidated because it only addressed matters of domestic concern. The
third is included so that the Senate does not override the power of the U.S.
House of Representatives or the President in unilaterally passing domestic leg-
islation through the use of RUDs.
Further limitations should look outward at how the United States can avoid
conflicts with other states and the international community at large. Toward
that goal, RUDs should be avoided except where absolutely necessary to re-
main consistent with what the United States could legitimately sign onto given
its own domestic laws. If the United States decides that it wishes to ratify a
treaty, then it should only do so after changing those domestic laws, or other-
wise with only the RUDs that are absolutely necessary.184 Encouraging states to
184. See, e.g., David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1183, 1205-o6 (1993) ("[T]he most common criticisms of the specific elements of
the ... [RUDs package for ICCPR ratification] have been that they were not legally neces-
sary and that the United States should have conformed its laws and practices to the interna-
tional standards reflected in the Covenant.").
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find boundaries on their use of RUDs already exists as an enterprise."'s The
following principles aim to revive and revise past suggestions, which include
recommendations made by scholars proposing looser grounds for RUDs us-
age. 186 In each instance, the proposed principle adheres to the limitation that
the RUD does not violate the "object and purpose" of the treaty, an overarching
limitation discussed in more detail in the next Section.
First, some have suggested that RUDs are necessary when ratifying treaties
that would otherwise create obligations for the United States that would violate
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.1 17 A general RUD that reminds that the
Constitution has supremacy over a treaty might demonstrate to treaty partners
the limit of the U.S. government's legal authority given the U.S. Constitution.
Such a principle is already well-accepted in constitutional law,' and albeit un-
necessary, the clarification seems relatively benign as long as the RUD is not
intended to shield specific treaty provisions that are obviously in conflict with
the Constitution. Second, where the United States has to prevent a conflict
among U.S. states or existing legislation that already governs and adequately
addresses treaty obligations, RUDs can clarify the distinction and boundaries,
including whether new legislation would need to be implemented for further
legal effects.
But federal and state law in many cases often already "meets or exceeds the
requirements" of a particular treaty the United States is considering-the
RUDs are therefore intended as an additional protection but are actually not
185. See, e.g., id. at 1207 ("The task, therefore, is, first, to identify any provisions of the treaty
which conflict with or raise significant questions about U.S. law, and, second, to determine
whether a change to the relevant U.S. law is possible and desirable or whether an appropri-
ate reservation, understanding, or declaration must be taken to condition U.S. obligations
under the instrument."); Tyagi, supra note 154, at 258 ("To develop a new policy perspective
on reservations, it is essential to focus on the basic premise of human rights law. Each State
party to a human rights treaty has a duty to overcome difficulties in the implementation of
treaty obligations and, if those difficulties have assumed the form of reservations, the reserv-
ing State is expected to take measures to minimize the effect of reservations . . . . Thus, un-
like some controversial responses at the international level, the domestic approach to reser-
vations may produce rich dividends with minimum friction and maximum comfort in the
long run. Indeed, it can be a useful complement to the international legal controls of reser-
vations.").
186. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 184, at 1207 ("Where the treaty provision is inferior, there is no
reason for the United States to adhere to it, even if that could be done constitutionally.").
187. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 3, at 342 (" [A] reservation to avoid an obligation that the United
States could not carry out because of constitutional limitations is appropriate, indeed neces-
sary.").
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necessary to protect U.S. interests.8 9 These RUDs should therefore be used to
help clarify positions, but not to eschew obligations. Non-self-executing decla-
rations are prime examples of RUDs that avoid obligations; they should there-
fore be minimized.90 In other words, the United States should not opt for a
non-self-executing declaration to avoid its otherwise lack of readiness to abide
by certain obligations of a treaty domestically and internationally. Instead, it
should determine where the gaps are and attempt to rectify them prior to ratifi-
cation, and only as necessary, to use specific, narrow RUDs to address the few
issues where the United States has a particular concern. Finally, the United
States should consider an understanding or a declaration in lieu of reservations,
even where a reservation is permitted.'9 As the international case law and
practice of no-reservation clauses reflect, altering the legal effect of a treaty that
has been negotiated and ratified by other states through reservations is a risky
practice that should be avoided when a simpler clarification would suffice.192
These recommendations are meant to be consistent with U.S. court juris-
prudence that has readily upheld RUDs in many different forms. The main
point is to suggest that there is little reason to overuse RUDs when they could
be costly from an international perspective and do not have much added value
from a domestic perspective. These are not exhaustive recommendations, nor
can they apply with equal force in every situation. At the same time, part of the
U.S. Senate's advice and consent process is for the institution to use its best
judgment in determining the appropriate role for RUDs. Hopefully, members
of the Senate and others involved in the treatymaking process will consider
18g. HEARING ON THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 2,
at 7 ("In the vast majority of cases, existing federal and state law meets or exceeds the re-
quirements of the Convention. The recommended reservations in the resolution of advice
and consent . .. make clear that the United States will limit its obligations under the Con-
vention to exclude the narrow circumstances in which implementation of the Convention
could otherwise implicate federalism or private conduct concerns. Ratification of the Con-
vention with the recommended reservations will not alter the balance of power between the
federal government and the states. No additional implementing legislation is necessary with
respect to the Convention.").
190. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 347 ("In any event, declaring a treaty-here a human rights con-
vention-non-self-executing achieves the worst of both systems. A human rights conven-
tion, like other treaties, goes to the Senate for its consent, where -'undemocratically'- a
third of the members (plus one) can reject he convention.").
191. See, e.g., id. at 342 (suggesting that the United States could have more narrowly entered an
understanding rather than a reservation to limit the ICCPR's more expansive prohibitions
on freedom of speech, including forbidding war propaganda and racial hate speech).
192. See Ash, supra note 31, ¶ 27 ("[I]t is not necessary for the U.S. to eliminate all of its RUDs.
Instead, the U.S. need merely reexamine its RUDs and determine whether they undermine
U.S. goals.").
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these limitations, and RUDs that are tailored to respond to the international
community rather than overestimated domestic concerns will prevail in treaty
negotiations.
2. Limiting the Use of RUDs
In cases where appropriately limited RUDs are not possible, such as where
a treaty would be inconsistent with the Constitution or other domestic laws
and practices, the United States should not ratify the treaty at all. At that point,
it should instead first direct its attention to revising these domestic conditions
if it genuinely supports a particular treaty. This determination of whether to
ratify at all is crucial for avoiding the broad overuse of RUDs. As the case anal-
ysis suggests, the determinative factor should be whether the proposed RUDs
would violate the "object and purpose" of the treaty. This is the approach al-
ready adopted by the VCLT and could be used as a threshold within a state it-
self for its own deliberations. Note again that the lesson learned from this case
analysis is that the choice of whether to ratify should not hinge on the suffi-
ciency or insufficiency of RUDs. Domestic courts will consistently enforce
RUDs, and the United States should not refrain from ratifying a treaty because
it fears that its RUDs will be found insufficient in domestic courts.
But the United States should refrain from ratifying a treaty if it believes
that it is avoiding the treaty's "object and purpose" by creating RUDs that de-
tract from the treaty's aims. The aforementioned Senators who raised the con-
cerns over the reservations regarding the Genocide Convention were not only
raising a moral argument about the adoption of RUDs. They appealed to the
preservation of the international community's confidence that the United
States will meet its treaty obligations and warned about the consequences of
encouraging other states to similarly avoid obligations by using RUDs.
Additionally, some scholars argue that a treaty might have one primary "ob-
ject and purpose," or might protect a "single, overwhelmingly important
right,""' making RUDs problematic, whereas RUDs attached to treaties in-
volving multiple rights are less likely to sustain such a challenge. Being selec-
tive about when to include RUDs depending on the nature of the treaty may
therefore also mitigate concerns about their overuse. More broadly, being selec-
tive about RUDs in certain treaties may also protect interests for future treaties.
193. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 434 ("When a treaty protects manifold rights and de-
clines to prohibit reservations, it is difficult to conclude that reservations to a few of the trea-
ty's rights violate its object and purpose. By contrast, the Genocide and Torture Conventions
are both designed to protect a single, overwhelmingly important right." (citation omitted)).
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Treaties are not ratified in a vacuum, and the defeat of one treaty or the attach-
ment of RUDs may end up affecting the leeway to negotiate another, arguably
more important treaty.194 If RUDs are used too prolifically, their effects could
become meaningless due to reactionary, no-reservation clauses adopted in fu-
ture treaties.
As previously acknowledged, the VCLT admittedly provides little guidance
about how to define the "object and purpose" requirement, and the United
States has not subscribed to it. But again, asking whether a RUD meets the
"object and purpose" does not only have to be a VCLT-oriented or international
law inquiry; it can be an internal, domestic dialogue that should already be
happening in Senate hearings over treaties, but often is not, as other questions
about the unintended domestic consequences take precedence. The inquiry is a
means to directly engage with the concerns discussed in Section IV.A.
Lastly, it is worth noting that there is no guarantee that the domestic case
law will continue its favorable treatment of RUDs if more treaties expressly
limit RUDs and international courts increasingly invalidate RUDs. If interna-
tional courts begin invalidating more RUDs, whether under the "object and
purpose" requirement or other treaty provisions, it will likely place more pres-
sure on U.S. courts to at the very least consider these objections from other
states and parties. Of course, it is quite possible given the robust domestic ju-
risprudence in U.S. courts that even these treaties' RUDs will be honored, but
rather than bank on this possibility, the United States would be wise to focus
on trying to develop a sustainable RUDs practice.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether RUDs are and will remain valid and enforceable
remains central to the future of treatymaking. If courts of law will enforce
them, RUDs could remain a primary, if not necessary, tool for treaty participa-
tion. If they will not, states (including the United States) are left to more dras-
tic alternatives, including not ratifying treaties at all. These concerns over the
sufficiency and, in turn, the sustainability of RUDs are important dimensions
of scholarly and policy debates. While some scholars have long defended the
practice of RUDs as valid exercises of the U.S. Senate's powers, the use of
RUDs has also long been a target of criticism. This Note adds a new dimension
194. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3, at 125 ("Whether or not treaties are fungible involves value
judgments regarding the importance of one type of treaty over another. That judgment in
turn will determine whether an unconditional approval of one type of treaty offsets the con-
ditional approval of another type.").
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to that debate: U.S. and international court enforcement of RUDs appears to
be robust, except for international courts invalidating RUDs that conflict with
express treaty limitations. Consequently, the Senate's current prioritization of
the domestic unintended consequences is misguided and risks undesirable con-
sequences, including encouraging more treaties that limit RUDs and constrain-
ing the United States from participating in treatymaking in the future.
Rather, if RUDs are enforceable, recent jurisprudence points more to the
costs of overusing RUDs than to their benefits. The United States and other
states should therefore avoid drafting elaborate RUDs that are more likely to
attract negative attention within international courts and the international
community. As this Note has attempted to illustrate, the biggest threat to
RUDs is not their insufficient drafting, but rather their overuse. The limited
benefits to drafting stronger RUDs hardly outweigh the significant costs asso-
ciated with adopting those RUDs.
The future of RUDs is in the hands of the United States and its fellow
states. Without any significant risks to the domestic invalidation of RUDs,
there is no need for the United States to overuse RUDs and risk broader treaty
formulation and compliance among states. RUDs that go further than the nec-
essary bounds in which they have so far been sustained might lead to their own
demise. Instead, the United States has the ability to help lead a reoriented
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY
The case survey relied upon for this Note began with an initial search using
LexisNexis to find all federal court cases that included all three words "reserva-
tions, understandings, and eclarations" or the term "RUDs." "RUDs" has be-
come a common phrase in public international law and among courts over the
last three decades. The reasoning was that courts commenting on these practic-
es in a case would likely do so with the term "RUDs." The method was ex-
pected to provide a starting foundation for understanding how many courts
have addressed the issue.
Documenting decisions by the U.S. courts of appeals was a first priority
given that these courts are more likely to comment doctrinally on and provide
the most persuasive authority about RUDs' status domestically. The search un-
covered twenty-seven cases from the circuit courts. The cases mostly comment-
ed on reservations, but a few also considered interpretative understandings and
declarations. The search was then repeated for RUDs in all U.S. courts using
the same LexisNexis search for cases that referenced all three words "reserva-
tions, understandings, and eclarations." This search returned 393 cases, and
after a review of them, twenty cases of particular relevance. A new search string
was then used to find cases on interpretative understandings and declarations
as distinct from reservations. Given that interpretative understandings and
declarations might be presented in cases without the RUDs term, the search
was broadened to consist of all federal court cases in LexisNexis with the fol-
lowing general search string:
"Treaty declar interpret understand senate ratif"
The general search string returned over o,000 results. Many of the cases
were not relevant, so only the first 250 cases of the search were examined as the
highest ranked in terms of relevance by the search algorithm. Of all the cases
examined, only approximately five percent include a treatment of declarations
and understandings. For the first fifty cases, any discussion concerning meth-
ods of treaty interpretation was reviewed, even where there may not have been
a readily available interpretative declaration or understanding. Within these de-
cisions, there was considerable language regarding how the treaty was to be in-
terpreted and whether the parties' interpretations should be granted weight
beyond the strict language of the text. These cases, especially a few from the
U.S. Supreme Court, were important for grounding this analysis. For the re-
maining 200 cases, only those that had interpretative understandings and dec-
larations were pulled and used for synthesizing general principles.
For the international case law, searches were conducted on both Westlaw
and the Oxford Public International Law database using combinations of the
search terms "reservations," "declarations," and "interpretative declarations." In
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total, approximately two dozen cases out of approximately 300 reviewed were
found to be relevant. Of those, fourteen were most germane to the question of
validity and enforceability of RUDs and discussed reservations and interpreta-
tive declarations in specific detail.
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